Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General Rule and the Gorilla Rule by Martineau, Robert J.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 40 
Issue 5 Issue 5 - October 1987 Article 1 
10-1987 
Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General Rule and the 
Gorilla Rule 
Robert J. Martineau 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General Rule and the Gorilla Rule, 40 
Vanderbilt Law Review 1023 (1987) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol40/iss5/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 40 OCTOBER 1987 NUMBER 5
Considering New Issues on
Appeal:
The General Rule and the Gorilla
Rule*
Robert J. Martineau**
THE GENERAL RULE
"It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate
court does not consider an issue not passed upon below."
THE GORILLA RULE
"The matter of what questions may be taken and resolved for
the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of
the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual
cases. We announce no general rule."
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976)
* A well known riddle asks: "Where does an eight-hundred pound gorilla sleep?" The
response is: "Anywhere it wants." J. SARNOFF, I KNow! A RIDDLE BOOK 53 (1976). The
judicial application of this rule would be: "When will an appellate court consider a new
issue?" The response is: "Any time it wants." For an exception to the original gorilla rule,
see infra note 137.
** Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. Author, CASES AND MATERIALS ON APPEL-
LATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1987); FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN APPELLATE ADVOCACY
(1985); MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE. FEDERAL AND STATE CIVIL APPEALS (1983). The author
gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Michael Solimine and Mary Ann Willis for their
editorial advice and of Peter Miller and Kevin Roberts in the preparation of the notes and
appendices.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One aspect of the appellate process that most bedevils judges
and lawyers occurs when a party attempts to raise an issue in the
appellate court that it did not present to the trial court. This ques-
tion creates problems for the following reasons: (1) the general rule
against considering new issues on appeal; (2) the perception that it
is unfair to the appellant if the new issue is not considered, yet it is
unfair to the appellee if the new issue is considered; and (3) the
failure or inability of appellate courts to articulate any principled
basis for determining when and under what circumstances a new
issue will be considered. As a result, it is almost impossible to pre-
dict in a particular case whether or not the appellate court will
consider a new issue raised by the appellant. This uncertainty
reduces the value of being the successful party in the trial court
and adds to the already overwhelming caseload of American appel-
late courts by encouraging appeals. Further, in many appeals,
which would have been taken in any event, it can add two issues:
whether or not to consider the new issue, as well as the merits of
the issue itself.
Legal scholars have paid little attention to the problem, not-
withstanding the enormous implications of the decision whether or
not to consider new issues on appeal. In fact, the only article on
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the subject was published over a half century ago.1 Since that time,
courts increasingly are willing to consider new issues, bringing into
question the continued validity of the general rule. The purpose of
this Article is to reexamine the general rule against considering
new issues on appeal, explore the many exceptions to it, and ana-
lyze whether courts should continue to apply the rule. The Article
will also examine whether exceptions to the general rule should ex-
ist and, if so, which exceptions should be recognized and under
what circumstances.
To present the issue clearly, the Article will focus on those is-
sues in a civil case that (1) the appellant2 knew or should have
known about; (2) could have been raised in the trial court but were
not raised, only because of the act or omission of the complaining
party; (3) may constitute reversible error; (4) are sought to be
raised by appellant over the objection of the appellee. With these
limitations, other factors such as constitutional requirements ap-
plicable only to criminal cases, inability to raise the issue earlier
for reasons not attributable to the appellant, new theory to sup-
port the judgment, specificity, harmless error, and acquiescence of
appellee are beyond the scope of this Article.3 In essence, this Arti-
1. Campbell, Extent to Which Courts of Review Will Consider Questions Not Prop-
erly Raised and Preserved (pts. I-I1), 7 Wis. L. REV. 91, 160 (1932), 8 Wis. L. REv. 147
(1933).
2. In most cases the party seeking to raise a new issue on appeal will be the appellant.
An appellee can also seek to raise a new issue, obtain additional relief, or challenge a ruling
of the trial court that was not merged into the final judgment or by which the appellee
claims to be aggrieved. For reasons of convenience, the term "appellant" as used in this
Article applies to any party who seeks to raise a new issue on appeal.
3. In his three-part article, Professor Campbell examined a broader base of cases and
divided them into four categories: (1) general exceptions to the rule that new issues are not
considered on appeal, see Campbell, supra note 1, pt. I, 7 Wis. L. REv. at 96; (2) exceptions
based upon specific legal theories, id. at 100; (3) exceptions based upon the type of case
presented, id., pt. II, 7 Wis. L. REv. at 176; and (4) statutory exceptions, id., pt. III, 8 Wis. L.
REV. at 147. Because Campbell dealt with a more expansive set of exceptions, many of the
specific issues he explored did not involve the question of waiver. Some of these exceptions
include questions that are (1) first raised after the case has reached the appellate court; (2)
raised to support the judgment; (3) raised without objection by the opposing party, or; (4)
raised by the appellate court on its own motion. The decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S.
Ct. 1712 (1986), falls under one or more of these latter exceptions. In Batson the Supreme
Court reconsidered the constitutionality under the equal protection clause of allowing the
petitioner to make peremptory challenges to prospective jurors while specifically refusing to
base his challenge to the venire on fourteenth amendment grounds, relying instead on sixth
amendment arguments. For the debate between members of the Court on this issue, see the
concurring opinion of Justice Stevens, id. at 1729, and the dissenting opinion of Chief Jus-
tice Burger, id. at 1731. For a more recent case in which the Court refused to consider the
standard of negligence necessary to hold a municipality liable under 28 U.S.C. §1983 for
inadequate training of employees because the instruction allegedly construing the correct
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cle will consider the question of waiver by the appellant.
II. THE GENERAL RULE
A. Historical Development and Rationale
The rule against considering new issues on appeal is as old as
appellate review.4 Appellate review as we know it today originated
in the English legal system in proceedings against a jury or judge
for a false verdict or a false judgment. A review of a finding of fact
leading to a verdict was obtained through an attaint, which in-
volved a new trial before a jury of twenty-four persons. This group
of twenty-four reviewed the action of the original jury of twelve,
and, if it found that the original jury had rendered a false verdict,
the jury could be punished by imprisonment. The jury of twenty-
four also could render a new verdict in favor of the party op-
pressed by the original verdict, but the proceeding was primarily a
means of punishing the original jury.
A similar proceeding developed for challenging the actions of
the trial judge by accusing the judge of rendering a false judgment.
This semi-criminal procedure, which was a new proceeding against
the judge personally, evolved into the writ of error, the principal
common-law procedure for appellate review of trial court proceed-
ings. Both the title of the writ and its nature were predicated on
the concept that its purpose was to determine whether the trial
judge had erred. Unlike the appeal in equity proceedings, the writ
of error did not provide an opportunity for the higher court to sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the trial court with regard to which
party should prevail on the merits.
Under the writ of error review procedure the only issues that
could be presented to the appellate court were those that had been
raised and decided in the trial court. The entire purpose of the
proceeding was to test the correctness of the judge's actions. The
purpose was not to test whether the proper party had won, but
standard was not objected to in the trial court, see Springfield v. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. 1114
(1987). This refusal was over the objection of four members of the Court, including Chief
Justice Burger. See id. at 116 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
4. R. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE CIVIL APPEALS
§ 1.1 (1983)[hereinafter R. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE]; R. POUND, APPELLATE
PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 38-71 (1941); C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 39-
324 (1911 & reprint 1980); MARTINEAU, The Value of Appellate Oral Argument: A Chal-
lenge to the Conventional Wisdom, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1-11 (1986) [hereinafter Martineau, The
Value of Appellate Oral Argument]; Sunderland, Improvement of Appellate Procedure, 26
IOWA L. REV. 3, 7-12 (1940).
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only whether the judge had made an error. Logic and fairness dic-
tated, of course, that the judge could not have committed an error
only by doing something he was asked not to do or refusing to do
something one of the parties requested.
The division of responsibility between judge and jury and the
significance of the record were related factors supporting the re-
strictive nature of appellate review. A trial judge's authority was
limited to questions of law, while the jury served as fact-finder.
Because it would be an interference with the right to a jury trial to
review a jury's factual determination, the appellate court's author-
ity was limited to legal questions decided by the trial judge. Fur-
thermore, the appellate court could not rule on any question not
reflected in the record because the record was the only way to de-
termine the basis of the judge's ruling. At the time, the record con-
sisted only of formal documents filed in court and the official rec-
ord of the actions of the jury and the judge. Because there was no
way to record verbatim what occurred at trial, a procedure devel-
oped whereby a party could challenge a court's action that other-
wise would not be reflected in the record (e.g., a ruling or an objec-
tion to evidence or a request for an instruction). Under this
procedure, a party could ask the judge or a third party to record in
writing the action or inaction of the judge and the fact that the
party took exception to the judge's ruling. This became known as
the bill of exceptions and was sent to the appellate court along
with the record. In effect, the bill of exceptions was the complaint
against the trial judge. Thus, a matter had to be presented to and
ruled on by the trial judge before the issue could be raised in the
appellate court, both because of the nature of the writ of error pro-
cedure and the practicalities of recording the lower court
proceeding.5
A totally different type of review developed in equity. This
procedure was termed an appeal, and the review was de novo. The
appellate court could review the entire case, both law and facts,
and render any type of judgment it thought justice demanded,
without regard to whether the issue upon which the appellate court
based its judgment had been presented to the lower court.'
American appellate procedure followed the writ of error model
5. R. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE, supra note 4, § 1.1; R. POUND, supra
note 4, at 47-60; Martineau, The Value of Appellate Oral Argument, supra note 4, at 7-10;
Sunderland, supra note 4, at 7-12.
6. R. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE, supra note 4, § 1.1; Sunderland,
supra note 4, at 9-10.
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rather than the appeal in equity, much to the chagrin of Roscoe
Pound and Edison Sunderland, the principal academic commenta-
tors on the appellate process during the first half of the twentieth
century.7 To Pound and Sunderland, this meant that appellate re-
view in America focused on a search for error rather than a search
for justice, which resulted in an overemphasis on the content of the
record.' According to Pound, most of the effort to reform the
American appellate process in the period between 1900 and World
War II was directed at changing the focus from the procedure to
the merits (i.e., doing justice between the parties).9 This trend cer-
tainly has continued since that time. The most obvious examples
of this effort are statutes authorizing appellate courts to render
any judgment that justice dictates. 10
B. The Modern Justification
The significance of error as the basis for appellate review is
almost as strong today as it was in seventeenth-century England,
notwithstanding the long-term effort to have the appellate court
focus on the correct result rather than correcting error. The effect
of history on court procedures, of course, is felt long after the rea-
son for the procedure's development has disappeared." The stay-
ing power and current viability of the essential elements of the
writ of error procedure suggest, however, that the procedure has a
functional basis in addition to an historical premise.
7. R. POUND, supra note 4, at 107-10; Sunderland, supra note 4, at 10.
8. R. POUND, supra note 4, at 318-20; Sunderland, supra note 4, at 10-12.
9. R. POUND, supra note 4, at 374-76.
10. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1982) ("The Supreme Court or any other court of ap-
pellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or
order of a court lawfully brought before it for review.., as may be just under the circum-
stances."); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 909 (West Supp. 1987) ("The reviewing court may... for
any ... purpose in the interests of justice, take additional evidence of or concerning facts
occurring at any time prior to the decision of the appeal, and may give or direct the entry of
any judgment or order and may make any further or other order as the case may require.");
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2164 (West 1961) ("The appellate court shall render any judg-
ment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record of appeal."); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R,
§ 5522(a) (McKinney Supp. 1987) ("A court to which an appeal is taken may reverse, af-
firm, or modify, wholly or in part, any judgment...."). For a description of how the New
York statute is used to permit the entry of any judgment or order the appellate court thinks
is in the interest of justice, see Hopkins, The Role of an Intermediate Appellate Court, 41
BROOKLYN L. REV. 459, 473-75 (1975).
11. For a discussion of the effort to retain fact pleading in some types of cases such as
civil rights suits and prisoner petitions, see C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 446-47
(4th ed. 1983). The equity system of law still has a strong effect, particularly in the area of
remedies. See generally D. DOBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 65-68 (1973).
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In Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.12 Judge Ruggero
Aldisert of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated suc-
cinctly the rationale for the general rule in modern appellate prac-
tice. The major question in Pfeifer was the proper method of mea-
suring damages involving future lost wages. The appellant argued
that the trial court had applied the Pennsylvania state court's
formula rather than the federal standard." The Third Circuit held
that the appellant had not preserved properly the issue of whether
the trial court had applied the state rather than the federal rule,
and was limited to arguing the proper elements of damages under
the federal rule. The court stated that in order to establish revers-
ible error, the appellant must identify the error to the trial court
and suggest a legally appropriate course of action.14 The court ob-
served that the reasons for this requirement
go to the heart of the common law tradition and the adversary system. It
affords an opportunity for correction and avoidance in the trial court in vari-
ous ways: it gives the adversary the opportunity either to avoid the chal-
lenged action or to present a reasoned defense of the trial court's action; and
it provides the trial court with the alternative of altering or modifying a deci-
sion or of ordering a more fully developed record for review.16
The court pointed out that the philosophy behind the requirement
is embodied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 46, which requires
that a party make known to the trial court the action it requests or
opposes and give the reasons therefore. 6
While recognizing the common-law tradition behind the gen-
eral rule, this approach justifies the rule against considering new
issues on appeal in terms of "correction and avoidance"' 7 by either
the adversary or the trial court. The rationale is that if the party
who objects to the trial court's action is forced to state its objec-
tion and to offer an alternative, the adversary or the trial court or
both can decide whether to agree with the objecting party, offer a
third alternative, or set out in the record the factual or legal basis
for the trial court's action. If the adversary or the court accepts the
objecting party's proposal, there is no error insofar as that party is
concerned and thus no basis for appeal. If the adversary or the
trial court follows a course of action that differs both from the ac-
tion originally objected to and the objecting party's alternative
12. 678 F.2d 453, 456 (3d Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 462 U.S. 523 (1983).
13. Pfeifer, 678 F.2d at 456-57.
14. Id. at 457 n.1.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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proposal, the objecting party may be satisfied and once again not
pursue an appeal. If the trial court proceeds as originally planned
notwithstanding the objection, both the adversary and the trial
court can ensure that the record supports the factual and legal ba-
sis for the action, thus making it easier for the adversary to defend
the action on appeal and less likely that the appellate court will
find the trial court's action reversible error.
The validity of this approach should be examined from the
viewpoints of the private and public interests involved in the court
proceeding. The private interests are those of the litigants in the
particular case. From the perspective of the party who is affected
adversely by the trial court action, common sense dictates that the
party should be compelled to "speak up now or forever hold your
peace" if the party realizes or should realize at the time the action
is taken that the effect will be adverse to its interests. In various
legal contexts, this principle is characterized as waiver, clean
hands, and invited error. At the heart of these doctrines is the es-
sential point that a person should not benefit from his own inac-
tion or, stated obversely, a person has an obligation to assert his
rights at the first opportunity or within a specified time. The vari-
ous rules of procedure that require a matter to be raised in a par-
ticular document,"' by a particular time,19 or in a particular way,
20
with the failure to do so resulting in a forfeiture of the right or
claim are merely expressions of the same principle. Implicit in the
general rule against considering new issues on appeal is the recog-
nition that courts must come to a conclusion if they are to perform
their function of resolving disputes; but to reach conclusions,
courts must enforce rules of procedure.2 It is not unreasonable to
18. For example, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a), if a party makes a mo-
tion but omits certain defenses or objections that can be raised by motion, the defenses or
objections are waived. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a).
19. Under Rule 12(a) certain defenses must be raised in the first responsive pleading
or in a motion filed prior to the responsive pleading. Id.
20. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure outline many steps that must be taken, in-
cluding service of process, FED. R. Civ. P. 4 & 5; adding third parties to suit, id. 14(a);
joinder of parties, id. 19(a); dropping or adding parties, id. 21; initiating class actions, id. 23;
intervention, id. 24(c); use of depositions in court, id. 32(a).
21. In United States v. Seigel, 168 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1948), the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia recognized this principle, stating:
Rules of procedure.., are not mere naked technicalities .... [R]easonable adherence
to clear, reasonable and known rules of procedure is essential to the administration of
justice. Justice cannot be administered in chaos.... If the courts must stop to inquire
where substantial justice on the merits lies every time a litigant refuses to abide [by]
the reasonable and known rules of procedure, there will be no administration of justice.
Id. at 146 (footnote omitted).
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expect that persons who avail themselves of a forum should follow
that forum's rules of procedure, and not be heard to complain
about an adverse effect from their failure to do so.
From the viewpoint of the adversary whose interests are ad-
vanced by the trial court's action, requiring the objecting party to
speak up at the time the action occurs is not only highly desirable
but a matter of simple fairness. If the adverse party is aware of the
objection the party can, as Judge Aldisert has pointed out, urge
that the action not be taken, an alternative be adopted, or make as
complete a record as possible to support the action." If no objec-
tion is made, the adverse party may think that the other party
agrees with the action or for tactical reasons decides not to raise an
objection. In either case the adverse party may fail to develop a
record that would support the action taken or forgo taking some
step that would avoid the alleged error. The failure to object is
particularly important with regard to the development of the rec-
ord. The party seeking to have the trial court act is unlikely to
attempt to put the basis for the request in the record when there is
no objection from the other party. That is just "gilding the lily"
insofar as the trial court proceedings are concerned. Competent
trial counsel always are conscious of the hazards of trying to prove
that which does not have to be proven and of appearing to waste
the court's time in so doing.
The public interests to consider include those of the trial and
appellate courts and other present and future litigants who look to
the courts to resolve disputes. It is difficult to see any positive ef-
fect on the trial court other than the time saved initially when no
objection is made. Three results can flow from considering a new
issue on appeal. First, the appellate court will consider the new
issue to be reversible error requiring either the entry of a new
judgment or, more likely, further proceedings in the trial court.
Second, the appellate court will not find reversible error, in which
case the trial court's original judgment will stand (unless some
other reversible error is found). Third, the appellate court will find
reversible error not only on the new issue but on some other prop-
erly preserved issue that requires further proceedings in the trial
court. From the viewpoint of the trial court, the effect of consider-
ing the new issue may be neutral at best, requiring no additional
time on its part. At worst the new issue may require substantial
additional proceedings in the trial court and possibly a new trial,
22. Pfeifer, 678 F.2d at 457 n.1.
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which is the most likely result of reversible error. Furthermore, the
appellate court is unlikely to consider the new issue unless the
court perceives some likelihood that reversible error exists."
Invariably, there is a negative effect on the appellate court
when new issues are raised on appeal. Each time an appellant asks
the appellate court to consider an issue not raised in the trial
court, the appellate court must devote time to deciding whether to
consider the issue and, if it decides to do so, must then spend addi-
tional time examining its merits. Inevitably, the more an appellate
court is willing to consider new issues, the more likely it is that
additional appeals will be taken. A losing party who will not appeal
if the party knows that the appellate court will not consider new
issues may do so if it thinks that the appellate court may consider
the issue. The same principle applies in a case in which other is-
sues are properly preserved on appeal. The losing party may de-
cide to raise an issue overlooked in the trial court just in case the
other issues are found to be without merit. The work of the appel-
late court is increased in either instance.
Litigants in other present and future cases necessarily are af-
fected whenever an appellate court devotes time to a new issue or a
trial court is compelled to spend time on a case that has been re-
versed and remanded by the appellate court as a result of consider-
ing the new issue. Any additional time spent on one case necessa-
rily delays the consideration of cases involving other litigants. The
only advantage to other litigants occurs if they also seek to raise a
new issue in the appellate court.
In Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co.2 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court analyzed the reasons for the enforcement of the
general rule against considering new issues on appeals. In Dil-
liplaine the appellant attempted to challenge an instruction given
by the trial court even though the appellant had neither requested
a different instruction nor objected when the instruction was
given."' The appellant argued that the appellate court should ig-
nore the general rule because the giving of the instruction by the
trial court was plain or fundamental error.26 The court acknowl-
edged previously allowing new issues to be raised under the plain
23. For an analysis of the application of the requirement that reversible error be
found, see infra text accompanying notes 62-63.
24. 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974).
25. Id. at 256 & n.3, 260, 322 A.2d at 115 & n.3, 117.
26. Id. at 256, 322 A.2d at 115.
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or fundamental error exception to the general rule. In eliminating
the exception, however, the court pointed to the exception's harm-
ful effects on both the trial and appellate processes. 28 The court's
analysis, which examined the effects on the adversary, the trial and
appellate courts, and other litigants, is similar to that outlined in
the preceding paragraphs.29 The court also criticized the practice
of allowing exceptions to the general rule. In looking at its own
experience with the plain and fundamental error exception, the
court concluded that another major weakness of the exception was
its ad hoc nature.3 0 Despite the court's repeated use of the excep-
tion, the court indicated:
[T]he theory [of the exception] has never developed into a principled test,
but has remained essentially a vehicle for reversal when the predilections of a
majority of an appellate court are offended.*** The theory has been formu-
lated in terms of what a particular majority of an appellate court considers
basic or fundamental. Such a test is unworkable when neither the test itself
nor the case law applying it develop a predictable, neutrally-applied
standard.3 1
This statement, remarkable in its candor, acknowledges that
appellate courts ignore a basic requirement of the appellate pro-
cess when they make exceptions to procedural rules for reasons
they describe as "plain," "basic," "fundamental error," or "in the
interests of justice." Appellate judges must recognize that they
cannot render decisions that apply only to the facts of one case.
Precedent and stare decisis are essential features of a common-law
system. Appellate courts undercut the entire system when they ig-
nore the precedential value of cases. Judge Albert Tate, Jr. made
this point in the following terms:
The result that seems "just" for the present case must be a principled one
that will afford just results in similar conflicts of interest. . . . [A] judge has
an initial human concern that the litigants receive common-sense justice, but
he also realizes that the discipline of legal doctrine governs his determination
of the cause.3 2
When courts deviate from this principle, they inject a degree
of uncertainty into the law that is inimical to the system of justice,
weakening the predictability that is such an important part of any
27. Id. at 257, 258, 260, 322 A.2d at 116-17. For a further discussion of the plain, basic,
or fundamental error exception, see infra text accompanying notes 107-33.
28. Id. at 257-58, 259, 322 A.2d at 116-17.
29. Id. at 257-59, 322 A.2d at 116-17; see supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
30. Id. at 259, 322 A.2d at 117.
31. Id. at 259, 322 A.2d at 116-17 (footnote omitted).
32. Tate, The Art of Brief Writing: What a Judge Wants to Read, 4 LITIGATION, Win-
ter 1978, at 11.
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system of appellate review. Without predictability, the appellate
process becomes little more than an exercise by which the appel-
lant attempts to persuade the appellate court that the result
reached by the trial court was not the "right" result."3 This system
of appellate review makes every appeal a de novo proceeding in
which the parties try the issue on the merits. Such an unpredict-
able system is inconsistent with the premises of appellate review in
this country.3 4 To act in some cases as though it were consistent is
to change the premises of the system on an ad hoc basis with no
clearly established criteria for doing so.
III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE
A. Criteria
A court usually does not give a rationale when it decides
whether to consider a new issue on appeal in contravention of the
general rule. Instead, the court merely cites the general rule if it
refuses to consider the new issue. 5 If the court chooses to consider
the issue, it points to some earlier case in which the same type of
issue was considered for the first time on appeal and then proceeds
to decide the issue.36 On a few occasions, however, courts have
33. For a criticism of appellate courts seeking the "right" result see Wright, The
Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 779-82 (1957).
34. For a discussion of Judge Aldisert's analysis of the requirements of the common
law adversary system, see supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Ryan v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 715 F.2d 644, 650 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (failure of appellant to raise issue of individual versus class taxpayer status in
Freedom of Information Act proceeding warranted nonconsideration by court); Evans v.
Valley W. Shopping Center, 567 F.2d 358, 361 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (no reason to
consider issues not raised below); Cannon v. United States Acoustics Corp., 532 F.2d 1118,
1119 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (even if claims meritorious they cannot be urged on appeal
when not presented below); Zeman v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 699 P.2d 1274, 1280
(Alaska 1985) (court refused to consider effect of oral contract when presented for the first
time on appeal); Santa Fe Nat'l Bank v. Galt, 94 N.M. 111, 113, 607 P.2d 649, 651 (N.M. Ct.
App.) (possibility that venue was fraudulently established would not be considered by court
of appeals when not raised below), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 628, 614 P.2d 545 (1979); Farmers
State Bank v. Thompson, 372 N.W.2d 862, 865 n.3 (N.D. 1985) (court refused to consider
theories of waiver or estoppel not "directly raised at the trial level").
36. See, e.g., Vintero Corp. v. Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento, 675 F.2d 513, 515
(2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (five cases from various circuits cited as authority for appellate
consideration of new issues if additional facts not required, or pure legal issue involved;
unjust enrichment issue considered when only argument for imposition of constructive trust
raised below); Ricard v. Birch, 529 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1975) (application of tolling stat-
ute could be raised for first time on appeal as exception to rule of nonreviewability); Burns
v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 265 Cal. App. 2d 98, 105-06, 71 Cal. Rptr. 326, 330 (1968)
(court cited three prior decisions as precedent for permitting new issues of law to be raised
first on appeal); Cronin v. Lindberg, 66 Ill. 2d 47, 61, 360 N.E.2d 360, 366 (1976) (citing two
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identified certain previously developed criteria for allowing excep-
tions to the general rule and have attempted to determine whether
the new issue satisfies these criteria. In United States v.
Krynicki,3 7 for example, the First Circuit listed the following fac-
tors as determinative: (1) is the issue purely legal, not requiring
the introduction of additional facts?; (2) is the proper resolution of
the issue beyond doubt?; (3) is the issue certain to arise in other
cases?; and (4) will declining to consider the issue result in a mis-
carriage of justice?"5 These criteria are helpful in analyzing indi-
vidual exceptions to the general rule because they can be examined
in light of the various interests affected by the general rule.
The first criterion creates an exception for purely legal issues
that do not require the development of additional facts. The issue
considered in Krynicki is typical. The court was asked in that case
to decide an issue of statutory construction-does the Speedy Trial
Act require an indictment within thirty days of the initial arrest,
even though the charges stemming from that arrest are no longer
pending? The trial court dismissed the indictment because it was
not made within thirty days of the original arrest. On appeal the
government argued for the first time that the original charges still
had to be pending when the indictment was handed down for the
thirty-day period to apply. 9 The Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit concluded that the appellee would not have been able to
introduce any facts bearing on the question at trial because its res-
olution was dependent solely on the language of the statute and its
legislative history. Thus, the court's consideration of the issue for
the first time on appeal did not prejudice the appellee.4 °
Courts have characterized many issues as purely legal, thus al-
lowing them to be raised for the first time on appeal. These issues
include questions of the applicability of a constitutional provi-
sion,41 statute,42 or legal doctrine43 concededly or arguably applica-
prior decisions that allowed exceptions based on public importance of legal issues to be
raised on appeal); People ex rel. Sterba v. Blaser, 33 Il1. App. 3d 1, 10-11, 337 N.E.2d 410,
416 (1975) (court referred to one prior holding to support new legal issue being raised when
all pertinent facts were before the court).
37. 689 F.2d 289 (1st Cir. 1982). Krynicki involved a criminal case on appeal by the
government. In its analysis, the court cited almost exclusively to civil cases as authority,
thus extending its reasoning to criminal as well as civil cases.
38. Id. at 291-92.
39. Id. at 291.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 535-37 (1962) (failure to question
absence of article III judge below does not waive issue); Federal Election Comm'n v. Lance,
635 F.2d 1132, 1136 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (facial challenge to constitutionality of Federal
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ble but not mentioned in the lower court. According to the
Krynicki court, the assumption behind this exception is that facts
are irrelevant to the resolution of the question or all of the relevant
facts are in the record." This being true, the courts reason that the
opposing party would not have introduced any additional evidence
Corrupt Practices Act could be raised for first time on appeal when facts fully developed),
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 917 (1981); McDonald v. Illinois, 557 F.2d 596, 601 (7th Cir.) (failure
of state's counsel to raise eleventh amendment immunity below does not waive issue), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Richins v. Industrial Constr., Inc., 502 F.2d 1051, 1056 (10th
Cir. 1974) (eleventh amendment immunity issue may be raised for first time on appeal);
Town of S. Tucson v. Board of Supervisors, 52 Ariz. 575, 583, 84 P.2d 581, 584 (1938) (con-
stitutionality of state statute of public importance and not requiring further facts may be
considered on appeal); City of Fort Smith v. Housing Auth. of Fort Smith, 256 Ark. 254,
255-57, 506 S.W.2d 534, 535-36 (1974) (due to the public interest in constitutionality of
Housing Authority Act provisions, appellate court addressed issue of constitutionality of
amendment to Act even though not raised below); Claremont Improvement Club, Inc. v.
Buckingham, 89 Cal. App. 2d 32, 33, 200 P.2d 47, 48 (1948) (appellate court allowed defend-
ant to raise new issue of unconstitutionality of restrictive covenant). But see Granada
Wines, Inc. v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 748 F.2d 42, 44
(1st Cir. 1984) (constitutional challenge to Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act
could not be raised for first time on appeal).
42. See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1969) (in interest of
judicial economy, applicability of Voting Rights Act provision not precluded from considera-
tion by failure to raise issue below where all facts undisputed); Telco Leasing, Inc. v. Trans-
western Title Co., 630 F.2d 691, 693-94 (9th Cir. 1980) (where issue purely one of law and
not affected by factual record below appellate court has discretion to consider for first time
application of correct state statute concerning attorney's fees); Higginbotham v. Ford Motor
Co., 540 F.2d 762, 768 n.10 (5th Cir. 1976) (new argument based on state wrongful death
statute considered on appeal where purely legal question raised and post-oral argument
briefs submitted); Smith v. Pasqualetto, 246 F.2d 765, 767-68 (1st Cir. 1957) (where relevant
"Sunday statute" overlooked below, consideration on appeal imposed no substantial injus-
tice upon parties if costs of appeal imposed on appellant); Redevelopment Agency of Berke-
ley v. City of Berkeley, 80 Cal. App. 3d 158, 166-67, 143 Cal. Rptr. 633, 638 (1978) (validity
of ordinance may be considered for first time on appeal where issue only matter of law); No
Oil, Inc. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 50 Cal. App. 3d 8, 25-26, 123 Cal. Rptr. 589, 602
(1975) (validity of drilling ordinances would be considered for first time on appeal because
of public interest implicated); Cordes v. Hoffman, 19 Wis. 2d 236, 120 N.W.2d 137 (1963)
(discretionary review of statute's applicability granted to enhance prospective application).
43. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1976) (purely legal issue of
federal abstention may be raised for first time on appeal); National Advertising Co. v. City
of Rolling Meadows, 789 F.2d 571, 574-75 (7th Cir. 1986) (case disposed of on new legal
issue to avoid deciding constitutional issue); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. City of N. Kan. City,
276 F.2d 932, 939 (8th Cir. 1960) (public policy underlying abstention doctrine merits appel-
late consideration despite failure to raise issue below); Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 742,
336 P.2d 534, 537-38 (1959) (en banc) (court considered restitution as theory of recovery on
appeal due to state's public policy); Zinn v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 148 Cal. App. 2d 56, 82-83, 306
P.2d 1017, 1034 (1957) (court permitted application of conflict of laws doctrine for first time
on appeal); Diversified Computer Serv., Inc. v. Town of York, 104 fI1. App. 3d 852, 854-55,
433 N.E.2d 726, 728-29 (1982) (in order to "achieve a just result or maintain a uniform body
of precedent," court considered new issue of township's authority to enter into contract).
44. 689 F.2d at 291.
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had the issue been raised in the trial court, and thus the opposing
party is not prejudiced when the new issue is considered on
appeal.45
This series of assumptions is of questionable validity.46 To
suggest that an appellate court can look at the record and conclude
that no additional, relevant evidence could have been introduced
on a completely new legal issue had the parties known it would be
decisive in the case simply flies in the face of what we know about
the trial process. No case is tried so completely and competently
that an appellate court can confidently say that the trial would
have gone exactly the same way if a new, determinative, legal issue
had been raised in the trial court. The presumption should be to
the contrary. It does not require a great deal of imagination to pre-
dict the reaction of the trial judge who questions the relevance of
evidence sought to be introduced that may not be relevant to any
issue before the trial court, but may be relevant to a new issue that
the opposing party may decide to raise in the appellate court.
Royal Indemnity Co. v. Blakely47 is one of the few cases in
which an appellate court has given a thoughtful response to an ap-
pellant's attempt to raise a new, purely legal, issue on appeal. In
Blakely the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court refused to con-
sider the question of the applicability of a statute requiring unin-
sured motorist coverage to the limitations on coverage in an insur-
45. See, e.g., Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1976). "[Tlhe
new theory raises a purely legal question. No facts could have been developed to aid our
resolution of the issue .... Under these circumstances, we believe it would be unjust now to
refuse to consider the new argument." Id. at 768 n.10. The Supreme Court of California
stated: "[W]hen as here the facts with reference to the contention newly made on appeal
appear to be undisputed and that probably no different showing could be made on a new
trial it is deemed appropriate to entertain the contention as a question of law on the undis-
puted facts and pass on it accordingly." Panopulos v. Maderis, 47 Cal. 2d 337, 341, 303 P.2d
738, 740 (1956).
46. Anyone who has been subjected to the vagaries and uncertainties of trial knows
that tactical decisions must be made at innumerable points during trial preparation and the
trial itself. These decisions include whether to seek out a witness, conduct an experiment,
hire an expert, conduct a deposition, ask an interrogatory, call a witness, ask a witness a
question, conduct a line of cross-examination, make an objection, make a motion, request an
extension or a continuance, and the like. The decision whether to pursue a particular trial
tactic is made frequently on the spur of the moment without time for full reflection. In
addition, these decisions usually are made on the basis of the issues raised in the pleadings,
motions, and objections that are developed during the course of the proceedings. Courts and
attorneys spend a great deal of time on pretrial conferences and pretrial orders in order to
narrow the issues, which reduces the amount of evidence that must be compiled and short-
ens the length of the trial. It is questionable whether any trial record adequately reflects
these tactical decisions.
47. 372 Mass. 86, 360 N.E.2d 864 (1977).
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ance policy. The appellee argued that it would be prejudiced by
the new issue because it had no opportunity to produce evidence
on the legality of the limitations. The appellee did not state explic-
itly, however, what kind of evidence it would have offered on the
issue. The court suggested that evidence could have been intro-
duced on the interpretation of the statute by the administering
state agency. The court pointed out that courts often look to ad-
ministrative statutory interpretations in construing a statute.
Forcing the appellee to show prejudice from consideration of a
new issue places the appellee in an almost impossible position be-
cause it asks the appellee to speculate on what might have been
different had the issue been raised in the trial court. The appellee
cannot state with any confidence what might have been different
and thus cannot be certain how it would have benefited had it
been aware of the issue in the trial court. By allowing the issue to
be raised for the first time on appeal, appellate courts ignore the
most obvious prejudice to the appellee: the taking away of a judg-
ment in the appellee's favor. Defeat rather than victory is the ulti-
mate prejudice. The response to this reasoning is that the appellee
is losing nothing to which it is entitled because the result would
have been adverse to the appellee anyway had the issue been
raised in the trial court. This argument is faulty, however, in its
assumption that the appellate court is able to know where justice
lies between the parties in some absolute sense and can ensure that
the "right" party prevails by considering a new issue.4 8
The reality of the judicial process renders this assumption un-
tenable. What an appellate court knows about a case, particularly
regarding the equities between the parties, is limited to what is
shown in the record.49 The record in turn is limited to the trial
court proceedings, which are a function of the pleadings, the abili-
ties of counsel, the rulings of the trial court, the availability of wit-
nesses and other evidence, the identity of the trial judge, the com-
position of the jury, the rules of evidence, the rules of procedure,
and the substantive laws of the jurisdiction. No one would argue
that the system is a system of perfect justice. In the words of Jus-
tice Holmes, the best that appellate judges can do is to ensure that
the game is played by the rules.5 0 Yet an appellate court ignores a
48. See Wright, supra note 33, at 781.
49. See R. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE, supra note 4, § 8.3 (emphasizing
that the appellate court's operating principle is "if it is not shown in the record, it did not
happen").
50. L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 306-07 (I. Dilliard 3d ed. 1960).
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rule long considered basic to the adversary process in an effort to
come to the "right" result when it decides a case on a legal issue
not raised in the trial court.5
1
Considering a new legal issue on appeal unless the appellee
can show prejudice also ignores the practicalities of appellate prac-
tice. In the usual case the appellant will raise the new issue in its
initial brief. Consequently, the appellee will learn of the new issue
for the first time when it receives the appellant's brief. The appel-
lee has thirty days at most in which to file its own brief in which
the appellee must address those issues raised by the appellant that
were considered in the trial court, the question of whether the new
issue should be considered by the appellate court, and the merits
of that issue. The appellee also must address whether considering
the new issue is permitted under any exception to the general rule.
If consideration is permitted, the appellee must attempt to show
prejudice. Thus, the appellee has but a few short days in which to
develop theories and arguments and conduct research on an issue
that it otherwise would have had months or years to develop had
the issue been raised in the trial court. Clearly, this is procedural
prejudice. Yet appellate courts again and again consider new legal
issues with a mere recitation of the rubric that the new issue is
purely legal, no new facts are required to decide the issue, and the
appellee has not shown that it will be prejudiced if the new issue is
considered.2
When appellate courts follow this course of action they either
do not understand, or chose to ignore, the implication of their ac-
tions. When the "purely legal" criterion is measured against the
51. See United States v. Seigel, 168 F.2d 143, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (holding that one
who is not a party to the record is not entitled to appeal in the case).
52. In re Howell, 731 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir.) (constitutionality of California Sales and
Use Tax a question of law and where facts stipulated or fully developed, may be considered
first time on appeal), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 933 (1984); see, e.g., Pegues v. Morehouse Parish
School Ed., 706 F.2d 735, 738 (5th Cir. 1983) (law of the case and res judicata doctrines are
purely legal; considered on appeal because no prejudice to defendants); Alaska Chapter,
Assoc. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Pierce, 694 F.2d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 1982) (argument that
HUD regulation not authorized by Indian Self-Determination Act and involves only ques-
tions of law may be considered on appeal); Panopulos v. Maderis, 47 Cal. 2d 337, 341, 303
P.2d 738, 741 (1956) (when facts are undisputed, court allowed new legal issue to be raised);
California School Employees Ass'n v. Sunnyvale Elementary School Dist., 30 Cal. App. 3d
46, 56-57, 111 Cal. Rptr. 433, 439 (1974) (court considered appellants new argument that
management of part of school system had been illegally transferred); Ware v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 35, 43, 100 Cal. Rptr. 791, 797 (1972) (court
permitted new argument based on provision of California Labor Act when all pertinent facts
were before the court), aff'd, 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
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modern rationale for the general rule,5 3 a conclusory statement
that the issue is purely legal and its resolution would not require
the development of additional facts ignores the likelihood that
both the appellee and the trial court would have had other options
in addition to the opportunity to develop fully a record to support
the action. These options include the decision not to take the ac-
tion in question or take some other action to avoid the objection.
Of course, these options are not available if the objection is not
raised until the case reaches the appellate court.
The second criterion listed in Krynicki for considering a new
issue on appeal is that the proper resolution of the question must
be beyond doubt.5 4 The Krynicki court found that "preliminary
examination of this legal issue by the trial court would not benefit
either the court or the parties appreciably" because the govern-
ment's argument was so compelling.5 5 This reasoning ignores both
the assistance to the appellate court of having statutes or other
legal principles first construed by the trial court where its effects
are felt directly, as well as the opportunity for the opposing party
or the trial court to take some alternative action or no action to
avoid the alleged error. Presumably, the likelihood that the trial
court would have persisted in its course of action after the error
was pointed out is highly unlikely if the action taken by the trial
court was so clearly an error. This criterion essentially is character-
ized as the plain, basic, or fundamental error exception.5 6
The third criterion does not relate so much to the issue's im-
pact on the case in which it is raised but its impact on future cases.
In Krynicki the court held that declining to reach the issue "will
neither promote judicial economy, nor aid in the administration of
the criminal justice system" because the issue was certain to arise
in other cases.57 This is a strange reason to consider an issue in a
particular case as an exception to the general rule. The only other
type of case in which the courts hear an issue not properly before
the court on the ground that the issue is certain to arise in future
cases is when the mootness of the case otherwise would prevent its
consideration.58 The justification for the mootness exception is
53. See supra notes 12-34 and accompanying text.
54. United States v. Krynicki, 689 F.2d 289, 292 (1st Cir. 1982).
55. Id.
56. See infra notes 107-33 and accompanying text.
57. Id.
58. See Nebiaska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1976) (case not moot
when issue, if not addressed, will evade review, yet be capable of repetition); Weinstein v.
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closely akin to the doctrine of necessity. Considering an issue in a
moot case is the only way the issue will be considered. 59 This cru-
cial factor, however, is not present when the only reason the issue
is not properly before the appellate court is because the issue was
not presented to the trial court. In fact, the assumption is just the
opposite. There is every likelihood that the issue will be raised
properly in future cases; thus, the court will be able to rule on the
issue without making an exception to the general rule. The court
can state its views on the issue in the present case without making
an exception to the general rule if the court wishes to do so. A
common procedure is for the court to decide expressly that the is-
sue is not properly before the court but to state what its position
will be in future cases. While pure dictum is not binding in future
cases, such a statement provides guidance to attorneys and lower
courts. This practice is followed most often when the court wishes
to take the opportunity to indicate that it finds no merit to the
issue being raised.60
The Krynicki court identified the last criterion-causing a
miscarriage of justice-as the most important."' In the Krynicki
opinion and other cases that follow the same approach, the phrase
"miscarriage of justice" is not defined.2 What the courts appar-
Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam) ("capable of repetition, yet evading review"
doctrine limited to instances in which challenged action is too short-lived to be fully liti-
gated and reasonable expectation that same party would be subjected to same action again).
59. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 546. "Our jurisdiction under Art. III, § 2, of the Constitution
extends only to actual cases and controversies. The Court has recognized, however, that
jurisdiction is not necessarily defeated simply because the order attacked has expired, if the
underlying dispute between the parties is one 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'"
Id. (citations omitted).
60. See, e.g., Lee v. Hodges, 321 F.2d 480, 484 n.6 (4th Cir. 1963) (after rejecting ap-
pellant's argument for federal abstention on the merits, issue then rejected because not
raised below); Royal Indem. Co. v. Blakely, 372 Mass. 86, 88, 360 N.E.2d 864, 866 (1977)
(new issue held not properly before court because not raised below, but still considered
because applicable to other cases, and result not changed by consideration of new point); cf.
Richerson v. Jones, 572 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1978) (although decision reversed on other grounds,
exhaustion of administrative remedy argument considered because of policy interests of fair-
ness to pro se litigants); Campbell, supra note 1, pt. I, 7 Wis. L. REv. at 100.
61. Krynicki, 689 F.2d at 292.
62. Id.; see also Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 558 (1941) (appellate court prop-
erly considered issue of whether trust income taxable as gross income when plain miscar-
riage of justice would otherwise result); The Barge Shamrock, 635 F.2d 1108, 1111 (4th Cir.
1980) (use of wrong accrual date in applying statute of limitations would be "denial of fun-
damental justice"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830 (1981); Martinez v. Mathews, 544 F.2d 1233,
1237 (5th Cir. 1976) (refusal to consider migrant workers' theory of entitlement to majority
representation on health board would result in miscarriage of justice); Freifield v. Hennessy,
353 F.2d 97, 99 (3d Cir. 1965) (failure to object to erroneous jury instructions resulted in
"miscarriage of justice" which must be corrected); Fee, Parker & Lloyd, P.A. v. Sullivan, 379
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ently mean is that the issue would have resulted in reversible error
if it had been properly raised; failure to consider the issue will
cause the affirmance of a judgment infected by reversible error; to
affirm such a judgment would be a miscarriage of justice; to avoid a
miscarriage of justice the court will consider the new issue.
The logic of this reasoning has the virtue of simplicity to rec-
ommend it, but little else. Under this reasoning, an appellate court
should allow any reversible error to be raised as an exception to
the general rule because a miscarriage of justice will result if any
reversible error is ignored. This means that the only issues an ap-
pellate court should not allow to be raised as an exception to the
general rule are issues that do not constitute reversible error. If an
issue would not constitute reversible error, however, there is no
harm to either the appellee or the public interests by considering
the issue because the judgment that is appealed still will stand.
Consequently, the miscarriage of justice criterion is simply another
way of saying that the general rule is not the general rule but,
rather, is a rule that should never be followed, at least in any case
in which it would affect the result.
In Krynicki it is unclear whether the four criteria on which
the analysis is based are intended to be cumulative or in the alter-
native. In Krynicki the particular issue satisfied all four criteria,
but the court did not indicate whether the result would have been
different had it not. The first of the four criteria requires that the
issue be a legal issue requiring no further factual development.
Presumably, the court would not consider the issue or at least
would remand the case for further development of the record if the
factual record was not complete." The latter procedure would give
the opposing party an opportunity to present any facts it thought
would support its position. While this procedure would reduce the
unfairness to the appellee, it would not allow the trial court or the
appellee, absent remand, to take an alternative action or no action
So. 2d 412, 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (reviewing record for insufficiency of evidence and or-
dering lower court to direct verdict for defendant, court considered new issue to prevent
miscarriage of justice), cert. denied, 388 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1980); In re Zeimet's Estate, 259
Wis. 619, 49 N.W.2d 924 (1951) (if court had not considered application of statute of limita-
tions, miscarriage of justice would have resulted).
63. See, e.g., Nuelsen v. Sorenson, 293 F.2d 454, 462 (9th Cir. 1961) (case remanded
because unargued and undecided question of breach of contract might require further
factfinding); Bebco Distrib., Inc. v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 485 So. 2d 330, 331-32 (Ala.
1986) (court refused to consider the ambiguity of a letter of credit because the issue had not
been pursued below and, as a result, there was insufficient factual material in the record to
support this issue on appeal).
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at all in order to avoid the claimed error. The requirement that the
issue be purely legal would appear to be a sine qua non of excep-
tions to the general rule.
Requiring that the resolution of the issue be so clear as to
leave no doubt as to the result appears to be cumulative with the
requirement that the issue be purely legal. As with the first crite-
rion, the rationale for the second criterion is that having the trial
court consider the issue would not aid in its resolution . 4 The sec-
ond could not exist independently of the first because if all of the
facts necessary for resolution of the issue were not in the record,
its proper resolution could not be clear.
Whether or not the issue is likely to arise in future cases does
not appear to be so much a requirement that supplements the first
two criteria but is simply an added reason to consider the issue. It
is highly unlikely that an issue would be unique to the pending
case and not likely to arise in the future. Even if this were the
situation, it hardly would be a reason to refuse to consider the is-
sue if the first two conditions were satisfied.
The requirement that refusal to consider the issue would re-
sult in a miscarriage of justice65 is clearly cumulative with the first
and second criteria. The likelihood of the issue arising in future
cases and the miscarriage of justice criteria could, however, be con-
sidered to be in the alternative. The resolution of the issue to give
guidance in future cases may be sufficient reason to consider the
issue even if for some reason the issue would not constitute revers-
ible error in the pending case. By the same token, avoiding a mis-
carriage of justice in the present case would be a sufficient basis for
considering the issue even if it were doubtful that the issue would
arise again.
In summary, it would appear that of the four requirements set
forth in Krynicki, an issue would have to satisfy both the first and
the second as well as one or both of the third and fourth criteria,
but not all four, in order to allow an exception to the general rule.
In other words, an exception to the general rule against considering
new issues on appeal is justified under Krynicki if the following
criteria are satisfied: (1) the new issue is purely legal and does not
require the introduction of additional facts; (2) the proper resolu-
tion of the issue is beyond doubt; and (3) either the issue is certain
64. For a discussion of the requirement that the issue be purely legal, see supra notes
39-53 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
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to arise in future cases or failure to consider the issue will result in
a miscarriage of justice in the present case.
Most courts faced with the question of whether to allow an
exception to the general rule do not make an analysis similar to
that in Krynicki. Far more common is for a court to consider an
issue solely on the basis of its substantive nature (e.g., legal issue,66
constitutional issue, 7 jurisdictional issue, 8 eleventh amendment69)
or its impact on the proceedings (plain error or miscarriage of jus-
tice7 0 ). Some cases have attempted to qualify the issue under one
of the criteria set forth in Krynicki without examining the other
criteria. For instance, in Singleton v. Wulff" the Supreme Court
listed two types of cases in which a court of appeals could exercise
its discretion to resolve an issue not raised in the trial court.72 The
Court cited those cases in which the issue was not in doubt or
where injustice may otherwise result. The Court, however, merely
was citing these instances as examples of when it would be appro-
priate for a court of appeals to exercise its discretion to hear and
decide a new issue. The attitude of the court is summarized best
by its statement, "[W]e announce no general rule. ' '73 Singleton
would have been a particularly appropriate case for the Court to
have established general guidelines for consideration of a new issue
on appeal.74 The Court reversed an appellate decision that relied
on an issue not considered in the trial court.7 5 The Court, however,
held only that under the circumstances of the case, consideration
of the new issue was improper.7 6 The Court gave little guidance
other than to cite two types of cases in which considering a new
issue would be proper.
66. See cases cited supra note 43.
67. See cases cited supra note 41.
68. See infra notes 77-88 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 107-33 and accompanying text.
71. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
72. Id. at 121.
73. Id.
74. Singleton concerned two physicians' challenge to a Missouri statute denying Medi-
caid benefits for abortions that were not "medically indicated." The district court dismissed
the complaint for lack of standing. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the physi-
cians did have standing. The court of appeals proceeded to the merits of the case because
the statute "could not profit from further refinement," and was "obviously unconstitu-
tional." Id. at 111-12. Because the statute constituted a special regulation on abortion that
discriminated against patients and physicians on the basis of the patient's poverty, the ap-
peals court held that the statute violated the equal protection clause. Id. at 112.
75. Id. at 109-11.
76. Id. at 119.
1044 [Vol. 40:1023
1987] NEW ISSUES ON APPEAL 1045
In view of this lack of Supreme Court guidance and the
problems with the Krynicki analysis, the remainder of this Article
will explore generally recognized exceptions to the general rule and
demonstrate the wide range of exceptions and their inconsistent
application. This Article will conclude by recommending circum-
stances under which exceptions to the general rule should be
permitted.
B. Analysis of the Principal Exceptions
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The most universally recognized exception to the general rule
is subject matter jurisdiction.7 The exception applies to the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction of both the trial court 8 and the appellate
court.7 9 Subject matter jurisdiction is considered so central to the
legal process that it can be raised at any time by either party,80 or
77. See, e.g., Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (because question of
standing goes to Court's jurisdiction, issue must be decided although not considered below);
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 16 (1963) (Court
not precluded from considering district court jurisdiction because not challenged below); see
also R. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE, supra note 4, § 3.5; Campbell, supra note
1, pt. I, 7 Wis. L. REv. at 100 (1933).
78. See, e.g., County of Oakland v. City of Berkley, 742 F.2d 289, 295 (6th Cir. 1984)
(right to contest pendant jurisdiction not waived by failure to address jurisdiction in district
court because issue of subject matter jurisdiction always before federal court); Knighten v.
Commissioner, 705 F.2d 777, 778 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (rehearing granted to consider issue
of subject matter jurisdiction of tax court even though merits of argument found to be frivo-
lous), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 879 (1983); Smith v. Grimm, 534 F.2d 1346, 1349 n.4 (9th Cir.)
(federal appellate court may review subject matter jurisdiction even through not raised be-
low) (citing Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884)), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 980 (1976); United States v. Rochelle, 363 F.2d 225, 230 (5th Cir. 1966) (subject matter
jurisdiction of court below considered sua sponte on appeal despite lack of discussion
below).
79. See, e.g., Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S.
391, 398 (1979) (argument that jurisdiction of court of appeals was defective cannot be ig-
nored, even though not contained in petition for certiorari); Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi, 741 F.2d
1169, 1171 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984) (court obligated to determine sua sponte the finality of order
on appeal); United States v. O'Neil, 709 F.2d 361, 369 (5th Cir. 1983) (court obligated to
raise issue of appellate jurisdiction on own motion); Dixon v. Delaware Olds, Inc., 396 A.2d
963, 966 (Del. 1978) (time limits for perfecting appeal mandatory to existence of appellate
jurisdiction and cannot be waived by either parties or court); Vournazos v. Vournazos, 71 Il.
App. 3d 672, 677-78, 390 N.E.2d 19, 23 (1979) (order appealed from neither final nor appeal-
able interlocutory order); Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (appel-
late court must consider question of appellate jurisdiction sua sponte when not raised by
other party).
80. See, e.g., Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426, 430
n.5 (9th Cir. 1978) (defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be asserted at any
time by either parties or court); Burleson v. Coastal Recreation, Inc., 572 F.2d 509, 513 (5th
Cir. 1978) (regardless of whether plaintiff had standing to appeal from take-nothing judg-
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by the court on its own motion."1 If an appellate court is not satis-
fied that it has jurisdiction over an appeal, the court must dismiss
the appeal.82 Because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived,
this objection differs from most other jurisdictional objections such
as lack of personal jurisdiction" and expiration of the statute of
limitations.8s
The requirement that a court have subject matter jurisdic-
tion-something that cannot be conferred by the parties either by
failure to object or by express consent 85-is a fundamental doc-
trine of civil procedure to which there are no exceptions.8 " While
there may be some debate over exactly what is an issue of subject
matter jurisdiction, 7 once an issue is fairly within the scope of the
ment in his favor, it could raise lack of diversity jurisdiction on appeal); Colspito v.
Califano, 89 F.R.D. 374, 379 (D.N.J. 1981) (defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction
may be asserted at any time by any interested party), quoting 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1350, at 544-45 (1969).
81. See, e.g., Baumann v. Arizona Dep't of Correction, 754 F.2d 841, 843 (9th Cir.
1985) (although litigant asserts order is final and appealable, court must consider jurisdic-
tional issue sua sponte); Ray v. Edwards, 725 F.2d 655, 658 n.3 (11th Cir. 1984) (appellate
court has duty to review jurisdiction of interlocutory appeal sua sponte at any point in
process); United States v. Beasley, 558 F.2d 1200, 1201 (5th Cir. 1977) (court has authority
as well as duty to recognize sua sponte a lack of jurisdiction over interlocutory appeal).
82. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 106 S. Ct. 1326, 1331 (1986) (recognizing
duty of Court to examine jurisdiction, in every case, notwithstanding litigants' agreement
that jurisdiction exists).
83. See, e.g., Pila v. G.R. Leasing & Rental Corp., 551 F.2d 941, 943 (1st Cir. 1977)
(defendant waived defense of insufficient service of process by omitting defense from motion
to dismiss); Skidmore v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 529 F.2d 1244, 1248 n.3 (5th Cir. 1976)
(personal jurisdiction may be waived while subject matter jurisdiction may not); Zelson v.
Thomforde, 412 F.2d 56, 58-59 (3d Cir. 1969) (courts may consider subject matter jurisdic-
tion sua sponte, personal jurisdiction waivable and may not be considered sua sponte); see
also FED. R. CIV. P. 12.
84. See, e.g., Paetz v. United States, 795 F.2d 1533, 1536 (11th Cir. 1986) (statute of
limitations affirmative defense that is waived if not included in pleadings); Peterson v. Air
Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 759 F.2d 1161, 1164 (4th Cir.) (settled that defense of statute of
limitations waived unless asserted promptly in answer or motion), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
312 (1985); Chapman v. Orange Rice Milling Co., 747 F.2d 981, 984 (5th Cir. 1984) (limita-
tions must be specifically pleaded or waived).
85. See, e.g., Koke v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 730 F.2d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 1984) (juris-
diction cannot be conferred on court by agreement only; irrelevant that all parties assert
that conditional orders are appealable); Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 639 F.2d 972, 978 (3d Cir.)
(recognizing duty of court to examine jurisdiction in every case, notwithstanding litigant's
agreement that jurisdiction exists), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 963 (1981).
86. See 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 80, § 1393. One court held, however,
that subject matter jurisdiction can be waived through a party's failure to raise the issue in
the trial court. City of Plaquemine v. Dupont, 388 So. 2d 127, 128 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
87. See generally Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter
Jurisdiction Before Final Judgment, 51 MINN. L. RE. 491 (1967), which argues that the rule
on allowing a jurisdictional issue to be raised at any time applies only when a lack of juris-
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term, the court must be satisfied that it has jurisdiction or dismiss
the proceeding. Concerns over how, when, or by whom the issue of
subject matter jurisdiction is raised are irrelevant. The various in-
terests to consider in analyzing the validity of the general rule and
its exceptions88 do not even begin to come into play. Put simply,
the general rule presupposes subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, al-
lowing the issue of subject matter jurisdiction to be raised at any
time is not an exception to the general rule but a precondition
before the general rule can become applicable.
2. Quasi-Jurisdictional Issues
a. Eleventh Amendment
Some courts also allow certain issues relating to the exercise of
jurisdiction to be raised at any time. The immunity from suit
granted to states by the eleventh amendment is one issue that is
treated most like subject matter jurisdiction. Recent cases have
held that when the state's attorney does not interpose the eleventh
amendment as a bar to a lawsuit against the state in the trial
court, the issue can be raised on appeal.89 The rationale for these
decisions is that the immunity granted by the eleventh amendment
can be waived only by the state legislature, not by the state's attor-
ney's failure to raise the defense. This position was first enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Trea-
diction appears on the record. In a footnote, Dobbs points out the problem of determining
what issues are properly characterized as involving subject matter jurisdiction:
A court is said to be without jurisdiction of the subject matter or to lack competency
when it has not been given power to hear the type of case involved. However, courts
have no fixed approach to characterization of cases into type, so that a great many
defects are said to be defects in subject matter jurisdiction, even when the court obvi-
ously has jurisdiction over the general type of action involved.
Id. at 493-94 n.15. For a review of cases in which appellate courts have improperly charac-
terized errors by the trial court as questions of subject matter jurisdiction, see Dobbs, Trial
Court Error as an Excess of Jurisdiction, 43 Tax. L. Rav. 854 (1955).
88. See supra notes 12-34 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974) (eleventh amendment de-
fense in nature of jurisdictional bar not waived even if raised in trial court); Telsz v. Kava-
nagh, 807 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1987) (district court had no jurisdiction to enforce against
state decree entered into by state when state raised eleventh amendment objection for first
time on appeal); McDonald v. Illinois, 557 F.2d 596, 601 (7th Cir.) (state counsel's failure to
raise eleventh amendment immunity constitutes waiver only if state counsel empowered by
state to waive immunity; because no state law granted counsel such power, no waiver oc-
curred), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Richins v. Industrial Constr., Inc., 502 F.2d 1051,
1056 (10th Cir. 1974) (because eleventh amendment immunity available on appeal, no
waiver by failure to raise below).
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sury.Y' The Court stated: "The Eleventh Amendment declares a
policy and sets forth an explicit limitation on federal judicial
power of such compelling force that this court will consider the
issue arising under this amendment in this case even though urged
for the first time in this court."'"
This position is contrary to the position taken by the Supreme
Court in Clark v. Barnard,92 an 1883 decision that was neither
mentioned in Ford nor overruled in any prior or subsequent case.
The Court in Clark held that the State of Rhode Island consented
to the exercise of jurisdiction by appearing as an intervening
claimant in a federal court proceeding. The Court reasoned that
[t]he immunity from suit belonging to a State ... is a personal privilege
which it may waive at pleasure; so that in a suit, otherwise well brought, in
which a State had sufficient interest to entitle it to become a party defend-
ant, its appearance in a court of the United States would be a voluntary sub-
mission to its jurisdiction .... 93
The Court distinguished a previous case in which a state had ap-
peared in court only to object to the exercise of jurisdiction over
the state. 4 The Court did not mention the necessity of examining
the state's statutes to determine whether the state attorney had
the authority to waive the immunity, as was done in Ford" and
subsequent decisions.9" The only issue in Clark was whether the
attorney had the authority to represent the state in court.97
Allowing the eleventh amendment to be raised for the first
time in the appellate court would be justified if the eleventh
amendment is viewed as a restriction on subject matter jurisdic-
tion. One court of appeals, however, correctly recognized that there
is a difference between subject matter jurisdiction and the eleventh
amendment because the latter can be waived while the former can-
not. 8 In this regard the eleventh amendment issue is much closer
to questions of personal jurisdiction and statute of limitations. The
90. 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
91. Id. at 467.
92. 108 U.S. 436 (1883).
93. Id. at 447.
94. Id. at 448 (distinguishing Georgia v. Jessup, 106 U.S. 458 (1882)).
95. Ford, 323 U.S. at 467-70.
96. See, e.g., Della Grotta v. Rhode Island, 781 F.2d 343, 346-47 (1st Cir. 1986) (exami-
nation of eleventh amendment claim revealed "peculiar circumstances" of explicit waiver by
state); Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 669 F.2d 142, 148 (3d Cir.) (differing positions of state
governmental branches insufficient to show intent to waive immunity; waiver must be clear
and explicit), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1048 (1982); see also cases cited supra note 89.
97. Clark, 108 U.S. at 448.
98. Ohio v. Madeline Marie Nursing Homes, 694 F.2d 449, 459-60 (6th Cir. 1982).
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issues then become the following: whether the state's attorney has
the authority to appear on the state's behalf; whether the appear-
ance should be treated as a waiver in the absence of an objection to
jurisdiction; and ultimately, whether the harm to the state by not
allowing it to raise the eleventh amendment defense for the first
time on appeal outweighs the harm to the interests of the other
parties and the public by so doing.
Allowing a state to wait to raise the eleventh amendment im-
munity issue until after judgment is rendered in the trial court
gives the state an enormous advantage. If it wins in the trial court
without making an eleventh amendment objection, the state has
the res judicata, collateral estoppel, and precedential benefits of a
favorable judgment on the merits. If it loses, the state simply can
raise the eleventh amendment issue on appeal and have the judg-
ment reversed. This is a classic case of "heads I win, tails you
lose."
If Clark were followed then even if the state is bound by the
previous judgment, the harm to the state is minimal. The state can
recover for the attorney's failure to plead the amendment the
amount of any money judgment on the bond of an attorney who is
a public official, or in a malpractice action against a private attor-
ney. The state also can limit the res judicata, collateral estoppel,
and precedential effect of the decision by pleading in a timely fash-
ion the eleventh amendment in any subsequent proceeding. Thus,
the harm to the state can be limited to a substantial degree. For
the opposing party, defeat is snatched from the jaws of victory af-
ter having been put to the time and expense of a full trial and an
appeal. The appellee's attorney is harmed if the case was taken on
either a contingent fee basis or the assumption that attorney's fees
would be recoverable from the state. The public interest is harmed
by the waste of judicial resources and the consequent delay in the
hearing of other cases. The public does benefit by enforcement of a
provision of the Constitution, but the eleventh amendment protec-
tions can be waived, as can virtually all other constitutional provi-
sions, absent some reason to put it in a special category. No such
reason has been advanced.
Viewed only as an immunity issue, the closest analogies to the
state's immunity from suit under the eleventh amendment are the
sovereign immunity of governments and the absolute and qualified
immunity of public officials. The ordinary waiver doctrine applies
to both the sovereign immunity of governments and the immunity
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of public officials.99 The waiver doctrine similarly should apply to
eleventh amendment immunity. As a result, the issue of immunity
under the eleventh amendment should not be an exception to the
general rule against considering new issues on appeal.
b. Constitutionality of a State Statute
Whether or not a federal court should abstain from ruling on
the constitutionality of a state statute when its decision may de-
pend upon the state court's interpretation of the statute is another
issue that the Supreme Court' 00 and some lower federal courts 01
have held is an exception to the general rule. The underlying rea-
son for the courts' reluctance to act on the constitutional issue, and
to allow the statutory question to be raised in violation of the gen-
eral rule, arises from the principle that a court should not rule on a
constitutional issue unless it is absolutely necessary to do SO. 10 2 Ar-
guing on appeal that the appellate court should not decide an issue
when no similar objection had been presented to the trial court is
not the same as asking the appellate court to decide an issue not
raised in the trial court. There is no rule that requires an appellate
court to decide every issue decided by the trial court.103 This same
99. See, e.g., Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, 797 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1986) (because ab-
solute and qualified immunity are affirmative defenses, not doctrines of a jurisdictional na-
ture, failure to assert timely these defenses constitutes waiver); Abraham v. Pekarski, 728
F.2d 167, 174 (3d Cir.) (failure to argue entitlement to absolute immunity based on legisla-
tive character of actions waived by failure to plead below), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242
(1984); Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex v. Greenholtz, 567 F.2d 1381, 1384
n.3 (9th Cir. 1977) (although immune from money damages, parole board members, by fail-
ing to assert immunity from legal expense below, waived immunity); Corsican Prods. v.
Pitchess, 338 F.2d 441, 443-44 (9th Cir. 1964) (because prosecuting officer failed to assert
Civil Rights Act immunity below, issue waived on appeal).
100. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1976) (new arguments in favor of absten-
tion may be considered on appeal because of equitable nature and court's ability to raise
issue sua sponte).
101. See West v. Village of Morrisville, 728 F.2d 130, 131 (2d Cir. 1984) (because effec-
tive state remedies available, abstention considered for first time on appeal although op-
posed by both parties); Urbano v. Board of Managers, 415 F.2d 247, 254 n.20 (3d Cir. 1969)
(appellee's failure to assert abstention doctrine below does not bar appellate consideration)
(citing Provident Tradesmen Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 126 (1968)), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 948 (1970); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. City of N. Kan. City, 276 F.2d 932, 939
(8th Cir. 1960) (abstention should be raised at earliest possible time, but failure to raise
below not waiver because of strong underlying public policy).
102. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341, 346-48 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (considerations of propriety and practice demand refraining from
deciding constitutionality of act until obliged). See generally C. WRiGHT, supra note 11, §
52.
103. See, e.g., Green v. Department of Commerce, 618 F.2d 836, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(party has no right to compel appellate decision on legal point unless necessary to its case);
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principle is used to permit a court to consider a new statutory is-
sue not raised below if it will permit avoidance of the constitu-
tional issue. 104
To allow the statutory issue to be considered in these circum-
stances can be viewed as an exception to the general rule because
the appellate court is not required to consider a new issue. As with
subject matter jurisdiction, however, the "no constitutional deci-
sion unless absolutely necessary" principle operates totally outside
the general rule. This principle arises not from a concern for the
party raising the issue but from basic considerations of federalism
and restraint in the use of judicial power. 10 5 Unlike the general
rule, this principle does not have its basis in the adversary system
or in concern for the rights of the litigants to the proceeding.
Whether or not a court should follow this principle in a particular
case depends upon considerations totally independent of the gen-
eral rule. Consequently, it should not be considered as an excep-
tion to the general rule.
3. Questions of Law
The exception to the general rule for pure questions of law is
discussed in section III, part A.'06
Association of Am. R.Rs. v. ICC, 600 F.2d 989, 999 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (appellate court
ability to bypass difficult preliminary issues and dispose case on result required by merits).
104. See, e.g., National Advertising Co. v. City of Rolling Meadows, 789 F.2d 571, 574-
75 (7th Cir. 1986) (new statutory argument may be considered on appeal in order to avoid
difficult constitutional argument); Correa v. Clayton, 563 F.2d 396, 400 (9th Cir. 1977) (con-
stitutional questions should not be decided when nonconstitutional basis for decision exists
even though not considered by parties below); Allen v. Aytch, 535 F.2d 817, 819-20 (3d Cir.
1976) (case decided on nonconstitutional ground not addressed below to avoid constitutional
decision).
105. In County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979), the Court stated:
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They have the authority to adjudicate
specific controversies between adverse litigants over which and over whom they have
jurisdiction. In the exercise of that authority, they have a duty to decide constitutional
questions when necessary to dispose of litigation before them. But they have an equally
strong duty to avoid constitutional issues that need not be resolved in order to deter-
mine the rights of the parties to the case under consideration.
Id. at 154; see also United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27 (1980) (indicating that a "court
will not pass on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construction of the statute is
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided"); McLaughlin v. Arco Polymers, Inc.,
721 F.2d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 1983) (court refrains from deciding difficult constitutional ques-
tion when case can be resolved on another issue); Mabey v. Reagan, 537 F.2d 1036, 1041 (9th
Cir. 1976) (when both constitutional and nonconstitutional grounds exist for deciding case,
court obliged to use nonconstitutional grounds).
106. See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
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4. "Plain," "Basic," or "Fundamental Error"
Other than subject matter jurisdiction and a pure legal issue,
the exception to the general rule most often used by appellate
courts is when the trial court makes an error that is described as
plain, basic, or fundamental. 107 One of the most common errors
within this classification involves instructions to a jury-either the
failure to give an instruction or the giving of an improper instruc-
tion. This Article will use jury instructions as the basis for an anal-
ysis of the exception to the general rule for plain, basic, or funda-
mental error.
The first step in this analysis is to define plain error. One of
the major problems in analyzing the general rule and its exceptions
is that courts seldom define their terms. Instead, courts do little
more than make conclusory statements. Nowhere is this more bla-
tant than when courts deal with the plain error exception. Re-
cently the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit attempted to de-
fine plain error by quoting a statement by Justice Stone in United
States v. Atkinson.10 8 Stone stated that appellate courts should
"notice errors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors
are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integ-
rity or public reputation of judicial proceedings."109 The Minnesota
Supreme Court has defined plain error as error that destroys the
substantial correctness of an instruction, causes a miscarriage of
justice, or results in substantial prejudice." 0
An examination of the development of Justice Stone's defini-
tion of plain error demonstrates how a narrowly drawn exception
to the general rule can be expanded into a roving commission for
appellate judges to seek out and correct error wherever it can be
found. Justice Stone's full statement of the exception reads as fol-
lows: "In exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases,
appellate courts, in the public interest, may, of their own motion,
notice errors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors
are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integ-
rity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.""' Justice Stone
was stating a rule with particular application to criminal cases in
which the court was acting in the public interest and on its own
107. For convenience hereafter referred to as "plain error."
108. 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936).
109. Rojas v. Richardson, 703 F.2d 186, 190 (5th Cir. 1983), quoting United States v.
Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936).
110. Lindstrom v. Yellow Taxi Co., 298 Minn. 224, 229, 214 N.W.2d 672, 676 (1974).
111. Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160.
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motion. Only if a court ignores these crucial qualifiers can the ex-
ception be expanded to apply to a civil case in which the appellant
is seeking to have the appellate court consider a new issue solely to
protect its private interests. Justice Stone obviously was concerned
with something more than just an erroneous instruction or the fail-
ure to give an instruction. This conclusion is made abundantly
clear by the circumstances of the case in which the statement was
made.
Atkinson involved the question of whether there was statutory
authority for a Veterans Administration regulation permitting gov-
ernment insurance policies to define total disability as including
the loss of hearing in both ears. The Court held that the govern-
ment could not raise the issue on appeal, having failed to object to
the jury instructions on the issue in the trial court.1 ' The Court
gave the general rule as its reason for not allowing the new issue to
be raised, citing fairness to the court and the parties as well as the
public interest in bringing to an end litigation after a fair opportu-
nity has been provided to present all issues of fact and law.11 ' Only
after discussing the general rule did Justice Stone define plain er-
ror.1 1 4 Stone concluded that the question presented in Atkinson
did not fall within the exception.11 5 Consequently, Justice Stone's
statement of the plain error exception was mere dictum.
In his statement of the exception, Justice Stone cited two pre-
vious opinions that he authored."06 The earlier of the two was a
criminal case in which the issue was whether the defendant's ob-
jection to a question by the trial judge asking the jury on how it
was divided and thus unable to reach a verdict was sufficiently par-
ticularized.'17 The Court held that particularization was not neces-
sary to allow review of the action because it involved the proper
relation of the trial court to the jury and could not be remedied by
a modification of the charge to the jury after the harm had been
done." 8 The second case also involved an objection which, it was
argued, was not sufficiently particularized to allow the objection to
be considered as raising the issue in the trial court."19 In this case
112. Id. at 159.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 160.
115. Id.
116. New York Cent. R.R. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310 (1929); Brasfield v. United States,
272 U.S. 448 (1926).
117. Brasfield, 272 U.S. at 450.
118. Id.
119. Johnson, 279 U.S. at 318.
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the error was the trial court's failure to prevent or correct miscon-
duct by counsel. The appellate court emphasized the trial court's
responsibility to prevent appeals to passion and prejudice indepen-
dent of an objection. 120 This last point is especially significant be-
cause Justice Stone framed the rule in terms of what an appellate
court may notice on its own motion, or sua sponte, and not when
the court may consider a new issue raised by a party. Although it
bears some similarity to allowing a party to raise a new issue, sua
sponte consideration involves substantially different considera-
tions. For this reason, the two questions have always received sepa-
rate treatment.
121
Justice Stone's essential point was that in some circumstances
the responsibility of the court to protect the integrity of judicial
proceedings transcends the adversary process. The Court held that
an attorney's appeal to a jury's racial or ethnic prejudice is one of
those circumstances. The courts have the same responsibility to
preserve the integrity of the judicial process as they do to ensure
they have jurisdiction; these are not matters that can be waived by
the parties. Thus they both fall into the same category and should
not be considered as exceptions to the general rule.
The plain error exception has received a full analysis in only
one case, Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co.122 In Dilliplaine
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided to abandon its long held
recognition of the plain error exception. The court's reasons for
abandoning the exception were based on the exception's adverse
effect on the various interests involved, namely the litigants, their
attorneys, the trial court, and the appellate court. 23 The court also
recognized the ad hoc nature of the exception and that neutral
standards for the rule never had been developed. Thus, the court
acknowledged that the exception was used whenever a majority of
the court felt in any given case that an error meriting reversal had
been committed. 124 The alleged error in Dilliplaine was the trial
court's instruction relating to due care in an automobile accident
120. Id.
121. Compare Vestal, Sua Sponte Consideration in Appellate Review, 27 FORDHAM L.
REV. 477 (1959) and Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 771 (3d Cir. 1974) (Aldisert,
J., dissenting) with Campbell, supra note 1, pt. III, 8 Wis. L. REv. 147. If a court can con-
sider a question sua sponte, the question can, of course, be raised by a party. The reverse,
however, is not necessarily true.
122. 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974). For a discussion of the Dilliplaine court's rejec-
tion of the plain error exception, see supra notes 24-34 and accompanying text.
123. Id. at 257, 322 A.2d at 116.
124. Id. at 256, 322 A.2d at 115.
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case. 125 The opinion of Justice Pomeroy, who concurred in the re-
sult in the case but dissented from the abolition of the plain error
exception, is instructive. In Pomeroy's view the plain error rule ap-
plies to
any trial error which deprives a litigant of his fundamental right to a fair and
impartial trial. This right is an integral part of due process of law, guaranteed
to all litigants by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Obviously it is only
an unusual trial error that will amount to a denial of due process, and in my
view, the doctrine should be available to remedy only those trial errors so
contrary to fundamental fairness as to reach the dimensions of a constitu-
tional violation.
2 6
The cases cited by Justice Pomeroy in support of his position
were criminal cases.127 There is no question that in criminal cases
the requirements of due process outweigh principles of waiver, par-
ticularly in view of the opportunity to raise constitutional issues in
post conviction proceedings. 2 One court specifically has refused to
apply the plain error rule to civil cases, describing it as a rule of
criminal procedure inapplicable to civil cases. 129 This approach is
valid because due process in civil cases requires only notice and an
opportunity to be heard; in contrast, far more extensive protection
is required in criminal proceedings. 130 Waiver of both substantive
and procedural questions are part and parcel of civil procedure.13'
Questions of due process simply do not arise if the requirements of
125. Dilliplaine, 457 Pa. at 256, 322 A.2d at 115.
126. Id. at 261, 322 A.2d at 118 (Pomeroy, J., concurring in result, but dissenting on
abolition of plain error exception).
127. Id. at 261-62, 322 A.2d at 118. Justice Pomeroy relied upon the following cases: In
re Adoption of I., 455 Pa. 29, 34, 312 A.2d 601, 604 (1973) (Pomeroy, J., concurring) (right to
counsel of such fundamental importance that it may be raised first on appeal), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1032 (1977); Commonwealth v. Hallowell, 444 Pa. 221, 226-27, 282 A.2d 327, 329
(1971) (voluntariness of confession used to convict appellant of murder considered for first
time on appeal); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 444 Pa. 312, 317, 281 A.2d 856, 858-59 (1971)
(Pomeroy, J., concurring) (denial of assistance of counsel deprived defendant of fundamen-
tal due process rights); Commonwealth v. Jennings, 442 Pa. 18, 23-25, 274 A.2d 767, 770-71
(1971) (jury instruction given at trial reviewed for fundamental error despite failure to ob-
ject when instruction was given); Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 557, 562-64, 248 A.2d
301, 304-05 (1968) (jury instruction reviewed for fundamental error).
128. See, e.g., Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955) (requirement that challenge to
grand jury selection procedures be raised before indictment invalid where indigent defend-
ant not provided counsel until after indictment; issue not waived); see also W. LAFAvE & J.
ISRAEL. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 993 (1985).
129. See Durham v. Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 311 N.C. 361, 367, 317 S.E.2d 372, 377
(1984).
130. See 1B J. MOORE, J. LucAs & T. CURRIER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, 1 0.405[4.-
1], at 222 (2d ed. 1984).
131. See 5A J. MooRE & J. LUCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE % 46.02, at 1904 (3d ed.
1986).
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minimal notice and opportunity to be heard have been met.'32
In applying these standards to jury instructions in a civil case,
a court should not permit an objection to jury instructions to be
raised for the first time on appeal under the plain error exception
if a litigant has failed to request or object to an instruction in the
trial court. Neither due process nor the integrity of the judicial
process is involved when a party who is participating in a jury trial
has an opportunity to request or object to an instruction but does
not through no fault of the court. The party had ample opportu-
nity to protect its rights, but simply failed to do so.
The provisions of Federal Rule of Procedure 51 and its state
counterparts demonstrate the impatience of the drafters of civil
procedure rules with tardy requests for, or objections to, jury in-
structions.' Rule 51 expressly provides that a party cannot assign
as error the giving or failing to give an instruction unless an objec-
tion is made, including giving the grounds for the objection. This
rule is not qualified so as to exempt a really "bad" instruction or
the failure to give an obvious instruction. There is, in short, no
plain error exception to this rule, and the courts should not create
one.
IV. "WE ANNOUNCE No GENERAL RULE"' 4
The ultimate goal of a system of appellate review is uniform-
ity.'3 5 Uniformity in this context means that persons in similar cir-
cumstances are treated similarly. In Singleton v. Wulff as3 the Su-
preme Court stated that one way to test the validity of allowing
appellate courts to permit exceptions to the general rule is to ex-
132. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.19, at 164
(1985).
133. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 states in part:
No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he
objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the mat-
ter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to
make the objection out of the hearing of the jury.
FED. R. Civ. P. 51; see also ARiZ. R. Civ. P. 51; IND. R. CIv. P. 51(c); MAss. R. Civ. P. 51(B);
OHIO R. Civ. P. 51(a).
134. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976) (appellate courts have discretion to
decide what new issues may be considered on appeal; no general rule announced).
135. See R. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE, supra note 4, § 1.6, at 18; see
also Parker, Improving Appellate Methods, 25 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1950) (proper administra-
tion of rules and standards requires objective and uniform review). But see Wilner, Civil
Appeals: Are They Useful in the Administration of Justice?, 56 Geo. L.J. 417, 426-29
(1968) (arguing that uniformity is no more likely with appellate review than without it).
136. Wulff, 428 U.S. at 121.
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amine whether appellate courts consistently apply the various
types of exceptions. If courts consistently recognize certain excep-
tions to the general rule, the general rule can be said to incorporate
these exceptions. Therefore, litigants, attorneys, and judges will
share the same expectations regarding considerations of new issues
on appeal.1 3 7 Attorneys and their clients will not be surprised or
disappointed when the court considers or refuses to consider a new
issue, which enhances uniformity and predictability.
The principal difficulty with this idealized description of ap-
pellate courts' application of exceptions to the general rule is that
it is exactly the opposite of how these exceptions are currently ap-
plied by appellate courts. Inconsistency is the hallmark of the vari-
ous exceptions. For every case that can be found in which an ex-
ception to the general rule is allowed, another exists in which the
court refused to permit the exception and enforced the general
rule. This is a situation in which the rule is sometimes honored
and sometimes breached, with no discernible basis for predicting
137. Even the original gorilla rule is not without its exceptions.
"Look. I'm sorry - If you weighed 500 pounds,
wed certainly accommodate you - but It's
simply a fact that a 400-pound gorilla does not
sleep anywhere he wants to:'
THE FAR SIDE, by Gary Larson. Copyright, 1986, Universal Press Syndicate. Reprinted with
permission. All rights reserved.
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when one or the other will occur. The best description of the cur-
rent status of all of the exceptions to the general rule was given by
the Dilliplaine court in describing the plain error rule in Pennsyl-
vania-the exceptions are nothing more than vehicles for reversal
when the predilections of a majority of an appellate court are of-
fended. This is ad hoc decision making at its worst.
Inconsistency in the recognition and application of exceptions
to the general rule is easily demonstrated. An examination of cases
in state appellate courts clearly shows that for every exception to
the general rule one court has permitted, another court has refused
to permit a similar exception. An extensive list of these cases is set
forth in Appendix I.138 The list ranges from subject matter juris-
diction to objections to the admission of evidence and covers virtu-
ally every aspect of the trial court proceedings.
Inconsistency also exists in the federal courts, but in a slightly
different way. The principal problem is not so much that one cir-
cuit will allow an exception and another will not (although that
problem does exist), but that the various circuits are creating an
ever expanding list of exceptions with little or no regard to prior
case law, previously developed criteria, or limitations imposed in
earlier cases. The statement in Singleton that "[w]e announce no
general rule," while intended to describe the lack of any specific
limitations on exceptions to the general rule means, in effect, that
the general rule is no longer a general rule.139
If the courts attempted to develop objective criteria for deter-
mining when an exception should be recognized and simply dif-
fered on the application of the criteria, inconsistency in the recog-
nition of exceptions to the general rule would not be a matter of
great concern. The cases indicate, however, that very few courts
have attempted to develop objective criteria. In the overwhelming
majority of cases the court merely decides whether or not to recog-
nize an exception, giving no rationale for its action. If the court
refuses to consider the new issue it merely recites the general rule.
If the court does consider the new issue, it simply states the excep-
tion to the rule (with or without citing authority for allowing the
exception). The question is resolved in conclusory terms with little
or no analysis to support whatever decision is made. As a result,
the dominant characteristic of the application of the general rule
138. See Appendix I, infra at 1062. This list is intended to be representative but not
exhaustive.
139. A representative list of cases demonstrating the range of exceptions permitted by
the federal courts is set out in Appendix II, infra at 1066.
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and its exceptions is inconsistency.
V. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
The rationale behind the general rule against considering new
issues on appeal provides compelling reasons for its continued vi-
tality. A few instances exist, however, when the general rule should
not be enforced. One instance is when the issue involves subject
matter jurisdiction, which is properly not an exception to the gen-
eral rule but a precondition to appellate review that a court should
raise on its own motion. 140 The same applies to those cases in
which principles of federalism or constitutional adjudication are
involved14 1  or when the integrity of the judicial process is
threatened.142
Besides those situations in which the general rule is not appli-
cable, there are other types of issues that can be raised for the first
time in the appellate court without doing violence to the rationale
of the general rule. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize
two avenues for a party to seek relief from a judgment: a motion
filed in the court that issued the judgment or a separate action. 43
Under Rule 60(b) a party can seek relief from a judgment for any
of six reasons. Some of the reasons would not be exceptions to the
general rule by their nature because they involve matters about
140. See supra notes 77-88 and accompanying text.
141. For a discussion of when issues of federalism may be raised for the first time on
appeal, see supra notes 89-105 and accompanying text.
142. For a discussion of when issues involving plain error may be raised, see supra
notes 107-33 and accompanying text.
143. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) states:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable
that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justify-
ing relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a rea-
sonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judg-
ment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b)
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not
limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally
notified as provided in Title 28 U.S.C. § 1655, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon
the court.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
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which the appellant could not have known at the time of trial."",
The others provide a well developed body of law for permitting
exceptions to the general rule, including mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, excusable neglect, void judgment, misconduct of a
party,145 or the reasons for which a court in a separate action will
grant relief from a judgment. 46 It makes sense to permit an issue
not originally raised in the trial court to be raised on appeal if,
under the law of the jurisdiction, the issue could be a basis for
relief from the judgment long after the judgment is final.
One of the requirements for allowing this type of issue to be
raised on appeal would be that the matter upon which relief is
sought was not known and could not reasonably have been known
in time to have been raised at trial. 147 Without this requirement,
this exception would allow the party seeking to raise the issue to
lie in wait during trial proceedings, hoping for a favorable result
there and, if unsuccessful, to raise the previously known defect in
the appellate court.148 This is essentially equity's "clean hands"
doctrine 49 applied to the raising of new issues and is applicable to
the Rule 60(b) type of motion.
Allowing the new issue to be raised under these circumstances
would permit the appellate court to rectify the error at the earliest
possible time. This procedure would avoid the waste and embar-
rassment of having the appellate court affirm the judgment only to
have the judgment subsequently set aside on grounds already in
144. These reasons would include: newly discovered evidence which by due diligence
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b), see FED. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(2); and that the judgment upon which it is based has been reversed, or other-
wise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective applica-
tion. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).
145. See generally 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 80, §§ 2857-2865 (1973);
7 J. MOORE & J. LucAs, supra note 131, 11 60.19-60.27.
146. See generally 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 80, § 2868 (1973);
7 J. MOORE & J. LuCAS, supra note 131, 1 60.28.
147. For example, relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6)
is not for the purpose of relieving a party from free, calculated and deliberate choices
he has made. A party remains under a duty to take legal steps to protect his own
interests. In particular, it ordinarily is not permissible to use this motion to remedy a
failure to take an appeal.
11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 80, at 214-15 (1973).
148. Compare Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 258, 322 A.2d 114,
116, with id. at 262, 322 A.2d at 118 (Pomeroy, J., concurring and dissenting). While the
Diliplaine court's opinion addressed only unknowing failures to raise exceptions at trial,
Justice Pomeroy's opinion reveals his understanding that deliberate misuse of the plain er-
ror exception was within the scope of the majority opinion. Id.
149. See generally D. Doas, supra note 11, § 2.4, at 45-46.
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the record. If the grounds are not in the record as it comes to the
appellate court, the new issue should not be heard. Allowing the
new issue to be raised in this instance would require the court to
remand the case for the purpose of an evidentiary hearing. This
procedure could be used too easily as a delay tactic and may not
even be necessary because the judgment may be reversed on
grounds properly preserved in the trial court.
V. CONCLUSION
The rule preventing an appellate court from considering an is-
sue not raised in the trial is as old as the common-law system of
appellate review. Even though the historical reasons for its original
development are no longer valid, the rule today finds strong sup-
port in the balancing of the interests of the litigants and their at-
torneys as well as the institutional interests of the judicial system.
Making adherence to the general rule a matter of discretion in the
appellate court has resulted in the effective abolition of the general
rule. The general rule has been replaced by a system in which the
question of whether an appellate court will consider a new issue is
decided solely on the basis of whether a majority of the court con-
siders the new issue necessary to decide the case in accordance
with their view of the relative equities of the parties. The only con-
sistent feature of the current system is its inconsistency. If courts
are free to disregard the general rule whenever they wish to do so,
in effect there is no general rule. The current situation is destruc-
tive of the adversary system, causes substantial harm to the inter-
ests that the general rule is designed to protect, and is an open
invitation to the appellate judges to "do justice" on ad hoc rather
than principled bases.
To restore predictability to this crucial area of the judicial
process, appellate courts should consider only those new issues
that are reflected in the record and would provide a basis for relief
pursuant to a rule similar to Federal Rule of Procedure 60(b) or a
separate action. If appellate courts were limited by this standard,
the occasions on which appellate courts would consider a new issue
would be sharply reduced. This standard would help restore pre-
dictability to the appellate process and serve the interests the gen-
eral rule was designed to protect.
There is no question but that appellate courts, like gorillas,
are subject to few restraints except those that are self-imposed. It
can only be hoped that unlike gorillas, appellate judges will recog-
nize the necessity for self-restraint in the exercise of their awesome
powers.
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APPENDIX I
STATE CASES
EXCEPTIONS:
CONSIDERATIONS GIVEN
I. Jurisdictional Issues
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The lack of jurisdiction of trial court is
considered by appellate court, though not
raised below, because such an issue is not
waivable.
Carillo v. Jam Prods., Ltd., 97 Ill. 2d 371,
376, 454, N.E.2d 649, 651-52 (1983).
B. Standing
Plaintiff's lack of standing to sue was de-
terminative of the outcome of the dispute,
since matters such as standing which related
to the subject matter jurisdiction cannot be
waived by parties in the trial court.
State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Bair, 463
N.E.2d 1388, 1391 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
C. Jurisdictional Amount
Insufficiency of amount in controversy in
proceedings below would be considered by
state supreme court because parties could
not waive issues relating to subject matter
jurisdiction.
Emery v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 8
Cal. 2d 663, 665-66, 67 P.2d 1046, 1048
(1937).
D. Indispensible Party
Absence of indispensible party was a fun-
damental error which merited consideration
on appeal, despite the failure of either party
to raise this issue in the lower court.
Yano v. Yano, 144 Ariz. 382, 386-87, 697
P.2d 1132, 1136 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
E. Sufficiency of Complaint
Defects in the establishment of a cause of
action will be considered for first time on ap-
peal, even though they were not raised be-
low.
In re Estate of Barber, 49 Cal. 2d 112,
118-19, 315 P.2d 317, 321 (1957) (en banc).
RULE:
NO CONSIDERATION
GIVEN
The question of the jurisdiction of the
city court would not be considered by the
appellate court when the issue was never
raised in the trial court or the pleadings.
City of Plaquemine v. Dupont, 388 So. 2d
127, 128 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
Political party's standing to challenge ap-
pellant's candidacy for office would not be
considerd by state appellate court when that
issue was presented for the first time on
appeal.
In re Barlip, 59 Pa. Commw. 178, 182,
428 A.2d 1058, 1060 (1981).
Appellant's challenge of amount in con-
troversy being below jurisdictional amount
of lower court would not be considered by
appellate court for the first time on appeal.
Wallace v. Wallace, 256 S.C. 294, 298-99,
182 S.E.2d 60, 62-63 (1971).
Failure to join tortfeasors and insurance
company as indispensible parties was an is-
sue waived when not introduced in lower
court.
Ferraro v. William Lyles Constr. Corp.,
102 Cal. App. 3d 33, 44-45, 162 Cal. Rptr.
238, 245 (1980).
Failure of declaration to state sufficient
facts to establish a cause of action was not
an issue which could be heard for the first
time on appeal.
S. & W. Constr. Co. v. Butler, 207 So. 2d
350, 351 (Miss. 1968).
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II. Constitutional Issues
A. Statute
Constitutionality of state housing act
provisions was addressed for the first time
on appeal because of manifest public
interest.
City of Fort Smith v. Housing Auth., 256
Ark. 254, 255-57, 506 S.W.2d 534, 535-36
(1974).
B. Ordinance
Constitutionality of forest zoning provi-
sion was considered for first time on appeal
because purely legal issue was presented and
because outcome of constitutional scrutiny
affected public interest.
Bayside Timber Co. v. Board of Supervi-
sors, 20 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6-8, 97 Cal. Rptr.
431, 439-40 (1971).
C. Due Process
Due process issue was not waived even
though it was not raised in the lower court.
Conner v. Universal Util., 105 Wash. 2d
168, 171, 712 P.2d 849, 851 (1986) (en banc).
III. Plain Error
A. In Civil Cases
Plain error doctrine applicable to civil
cases.
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., N.A. v.
Guthrie, 67 N.C. App. 622, 626, 313 S.E.2d
603, 606 (1984).
B. Error in Instruction
Error in jury instruction constituted fun-
damental error, which must be reversed on
appeal, even though the error was not ex-
cepted to below.
Security Mut. Casualty Co. v. Bleemer,
327 So. 2d 885, 887 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976).
C. Excessiveness of Verdict
Excessive damage award would be re-
viewed by appellate court in order to correct
fundamental error in the allocation of
damages.
Marks v. Delcastillo, 386 So. 2d 1259,
1267-68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
.4-
Court refused to consider constitutional-
ity of state consumer protection act, when
the constitutionality was not questioned at
the trial stage.
Devine Seafood, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of
Md., 37 Md. App. 439, 444, 377 A.2d 1194,
1197 (1977).
Unconstitutionality of zoning ordinance
was not considered on appeal because it had
not been pleaded in trial court.
Smith v. City of Alexandria, 300 So. 2d
561, 566 (La. Ct. App. 1974).
Argument based upon due process viola-
tions of both state and federal constitutions
did not merit consideration on appeal where
not presented in court below.
Chapin v. Stuckey, 286 Ark. 359, 368, 692
S.W.2d 609, 615 (1985).
Plain error doctrine not applicable in
civil cases.
Mayrose v. Fendrich, 347 N.W.2d 585,
586 (S.D. 1984).
Error in jury instructions was not the
type of error which could be considered on
appeal under the fundamental error
doctrine.
Coleman v. Allen, 320 So. 2d 864, 866
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
Excessiveness of verdict could not be
considered on appeal where it had not been
challenged in the lower court.
Feazell v. Campbell, 358 So. 2d 1017,
1019 (Ala. 1978).
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IV. Pure Legal Issue
A. General
Court considered new issue on appeal
where all facts necessary for decision were
apparent from the record, having a purely
legal issue to be resolved.
People ex rel. Sterba v. Blaser, 33 IMI.
App. 3d 1, 10-11, 337 N.E.2d 410, 416 (1975).
B. Legality of Contract
Legality of contract issue was not waived
by the failure to introduce it in the court be-
low and would be considered on appeal due
to its prospective precedential value.
Diversified Computer Servs., Inc. v.
Town of York, 104 Ill. App. 3d 852, 854-55
433 N.E.2d 726, 728-29 (1982).
C. New Legal Theory
New legal theory would be considered on
appeal to avoid possibility of fundamental
error wrongly deciding the outcome.
Love v. Hannah, 72 So. 2d 39, 43 (Fla.
1954) (en banc).
D. New Defense
Appellant may raise new defense on ap-
peal in order to avoid injustice or surprise,
as was the case where appellee (plaintiff be-
low) knew of a defense available to appellant
(defendant below) but did not reveal the in-
formation prior to trial.
Tarzian v. West Bend Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
74 Ill. App. 2d 314, 320-21, 221 N.E.2d 293,
296 (1966).
E. Estoppel
Although defense of estoppel was not
raised in lower court, it would be considered
on appeal in order to adjudicate correctly
the merits of the case.
Stewart v. O'Bryan, 50 Ill. App. 3d 108,
109-10, 365 N.E.2d 1019, 1020 (1977).
F. Statute of Limitations
Effect of statute of limitations having run
would be considered by appellate court when
raised for the first time on appeal.
Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps,
71 Cal. App. 3d 423, 426-27, 139 Cal. Rptr.
483, 485 (1977).
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When lower court fails to rule on legal is-
sue, appellate court will not consider that is-
sue, even where all facts necessary for deci-
sion are available from the record.
Santa Fe Nat'l Bank v. Galt, 94 N.M.
111, 113, 607 P.2d 649, 651 (N.M. Ct. App.
1979).
Illegality of contract defense was waived
on appeal because it had not been presented
in the lower court.
Piskorowski v. Shell Oil Co., 403 N.E.2d
838, 847 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
Parties are restricted to legal theories ad-
vanced at trial; appellate court was in error
for considering new legal theory on appeal.
Davis v. Campbell, 572 S.W.2d 660, 662
(Tex. 1978).
On appeal, appellant is precluded from
raising for the first time defense of adequate
remedy at law to bar equitable relief granted
below; conversely, appellee is entitled to
raise that defense or any other on appeal
which supports the judgment of the lower
court.
Shaw v. Lorenz, 42 Ill. 2d 246, 248, 246
N.E.2d 285, 287 (1969).
Parties who proceeded at trial solely on
the basis of adverse possession could not
present defenses of estoppel, unclean hands,
and subdivision on appeal.
Thomas v. Ross, 477 A.2d 950, 953 (R.I.
1984).
The issue of whether a statute of limita-
tion barred plaintiff's claim would not be
considered for first time on appeal.
Kootenai Corp. v. Dayton, 184 Mont. 19,
25, 601 P.2d 47, 50 (1979).
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G. Set Off
Tenant's right to setoff, which was not
raised at trial, would be decided on appeal
where trial court had erred on the question
of damages.
Wanderer v. Plainfield Carton Corp., 40
Ill. App. 3d 552, 561, 351 N.E.2d 630, 633-34
(1976).
V. Jury Instructions
A. Failure to Request
Failure of trial judge to give correct jury
instructions would be considered by appel-
late court where counsel had not requested
the proper instruction below.
Rivera v. W. & R. Serv. Station, Inc., 34
A.D.2d 115, 117, 309 N.Y.S.2d 274, 276
(1970).
B. Failure to Object
Despite failure of counsel to object to im-
proper jury instruction, that point could be
raised on appeal for the first time.
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Fulmer,
227 So. 2d 870, 872 (Fla. 1969).
VI. Evidence
A. Parol Evidence
Use of parol evidence could be challenged
on appeal where not objected to below be-
cause of its legal significance.
Humphries v. Haydon, 297 Ky. 219, 222,
179 S.W.2d 895, 897 (1944).
VII. Misconduct
A. By Judge
Where misconduct of trial judge was so
egregious that no objection would have alle-
viated the resulting prejudice to plaintiff be-
low, appellate court would consider the is-
sue, when raised, as grounds for appeal.
Love v. Wolf, 249 Cal. App. 2d 822, 834-
35, 58 Cal. Rptr. 42, 50 (1967).
B. By Counsel
Effect of prejudicial remarks made at
trial would be considered on appeal, though
not properly preserved in the court below, in
order to "ensure a fair trial and protect the
judicial process."
Underwood v. Pennsylvania R.R., 34 Ill.
2d 367, 370-71, 215 N.E.2d 236, 239 (1966).
The insufficiency of amount of the setoff
allowance decided below would not be re-
viewed on appeal where it had not been
challenged in the lower court.
Allred v. Smith, 674 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah
1983).
Party who had failed to proffer correct
jury instruction in trial court could not com-
plain for the first time on appeal of the trial
judge's failure to give that instruction.
Moore Ford Co. v. Smith, 270 Ark. 340,
342-43, 604 S.W.2d 943, 945 (1980).
Defendant's failure to object at trial to
erroroneous jury instruction precluded con-
sideration of that issue when presented for
the first time on appeal.
Pagnella v. Action for a Better Commu-
nity, Inc., 57 A.D.2d 1076, 1076, 395
N.Y.S.2d 834, 834-35 (1977).
Effect of applying parol evidence rule to
contract dispute between the parties would
not be analyzed when issue was presented to
appellate court for first time on appeal.
C. V. Steed v. Busby, 268 Ark. 1, 7, 593
S.W.2d 34, 38 (1980).
Alleged misconduct of trial judge would
not be considered as grounds for reversal on
appeal when not objected to in the trial
court.
Hurvitz v. Coburn, 117 Ariz. 300, 303-04,
572 P.2d 128, 132 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
The effect of potentially prejudicial re-
marks made by counsel for plaintiff would
not be considered on appeal under the
"plain error" doctrine.
Bowman v. Burlington N., Inc., 645
S.W.2d 9, 11-13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
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APPENDIX II
FEDERAL CASES
I. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Generally:
- Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934) (defense of lack
of subject matter jurisdiction may be asserted at any time by ei-
ther parties or court).
B. Standing:
- Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist. 106 S. Ct. 1326
(1986) (standing involves Court's jurisdiction and must be decided
first on appeal).
C. Jurisdictional Amount:
- Danko v. Lewy, 149 F.2d 66, 68 (5th Cir. 1945) (while ques-
tion of jurisdictional amount may be raised at any time, question
here lacked merit).
- Miller v. First Serv. Corp., 84 F.2d 680, 683 (8th Cir. 1936)
(where record affirmatively shows lack of jurisdictional amount,
appellate court has duty to take notice on its own motion and dis-
miss the case).
But see:
- Peoples Loan & Fin. Corp. v. Halbeisen Motors Co., 271 F.2d
538, 541 (5th Cir. 1959) (defendant's failure to contest jurisdic-
tional amount until case concluded precluded defendant from sub-
sequently raising the question).
D. Diversity:
- Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884)
(court ordered to remand case to state court when lack of diversity
was shown on record).
E. Mootness:
- Aquirre v. S.S. Sohio Intrepid, 801 F.2d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir.
1986) (mootness indicated on record raises jurisdictional question
that the court may consider sua sponte).
F. Notice and Service of Process:
- Pila v. G.R. Leasing & Rental Corp., 551 F.2d 941, 943 (1st
Cir. 1977) (defendant waived defense of insufficient service of pro-
cess by omitting the defense from its motion to dismiss, even
though plaintiff failed to raise issue of defendant's waiver below).
- United States v. Ball, 326 F.2d 898, 902-03 (4th Cir. 1964)
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(under jurisdictional statute issue of deficient notice in tax pro-
ceeding not waived by appellant's failure to raise the issue below).
But see:
- International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166, 173 (2d
Cir.) (deliberate and purposeful failure to challenge finding of in-
sufficient service estopped party from claiming service was suffi-
cient), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979).
G. Propriety, Three Judge Court:
- Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 n.2 (1968) (because the pro-
priety of the three judge court convened below constitutes a juris-
dictional issue, the lateness of claim is irrelevant).
But see:
- Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 338 n.5 (1975) (because issue
of improper membership of three judge court below did not involve
a jurisdictional requirement, appellant's failure to raise the issue
below constituted a waiver of the issue).
H. Defective Judicial Authority:
- Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 536-37 (1962) (failure
to question absence of article III judge below does not constitute a
waiver of the issue).
L Pendant Jurisdiction:
- County of Oakland v. City of Berkeley, 742 F.2d 289, 295
(6th Cir. 1984) (right to contest pendant jurisdiction not waived by
defendant's failure to raise issue in district court).
J. Indispensible Parties:
- Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc. v. Pitterich, 805 F.2d 96,
104 (3d Cir. 1986) (party may raise the issue of failure to join in-
dispensible parties for the first time on appeal).
But see:
- Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602, 613 (7th Cir. 1986) (defense of
failure to join indispensible party waived if not made in trial
court).
K. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies:
- Bolger v. Marshall, 193 F.2d 37, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (issue of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is jurisdictional and there-
fore may be raised for the first time on appeal).
L. Prejudgment Interest:
- Zumerling v. Marsh, 783 F.2d 1032, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
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(award of prejudgment interest against United States is a jurisdic-
tional issue and therefore may be considered for the first time on
appeal).
M. Preemption:
- Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, Inc., 803 F.2d 1488, 1497
(9th Cir. 1986) (federal preemption arguments implicating choice-
of-law questions are waived unless timely raised).
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. Abstention:
- Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143-44 n.10 (1976) (absence of
full arguments below concerning equitable doctrine of abstention
does not bar appellate consideration sua sponte).
B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity:
- McDonald v. Illinois, 557 F.2d 596, 601 (7th Cir.) (state
counsel not empowered to waive immunity; no waiver of immunity
by failure to raise the issue below), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966
(1977).
C. Facial Challenge to Statute:
- Federal Election Comm'n v. Lance, 635 F.2d 1132, 1136 (5th
Cir.) (facial challenge to constitutionality of Federal Corrupt Prac-
tices Act could be raised for first time on appeal provided that the
facts were fully developed below), cert. denied and appeal dis-
missed, 453 U.S. 917 (1981) (en banc).
But see:
- Granada Wines Inc. v. New England Teamsters & Trucking
Indus. Pension Fund, 748 F.2d 42, 44 (1st Cir. 1984) (constitutional
challenge to Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act could
not be raised first time on appeal).
D. Avoidance of Constitutional Issue:
- National Advertising Co. v. Rolling Meadows, 789 F.2d 571,
574-75 (7th Cir. 1986) (new statutory argument may be considered
on appeal in order to avoid a more difficult constitutional
argument).
E. Due Process:
- Complaint of Bankers Trust Co., 752 F.2d 874, 887-88 (3d
Cir. 1984) (in order to ensure due process, a new theory may be
considered on appeal).
1068 [Vol. 40:1023
NEW ISSUES ON APPEAL
But see:
- Fleury v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 698 F.2d 1022,
1029 (9th Cir.) (claim that lower court's construction of California
Code of Civil Procedure denied appellant due process not consid-
ered on appeal because claim was not raised below), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 846 (1983).
III. PLAIN ERROR
A. Jury Instructions:
1. Erroneous Instructions:
- Freifield v. Hennessy, 353 F.2d 97, 99 (3d Cir. 1965) (in-
struction to exonerate defendant if accident an "Act of God"
submitted new, untried issue to jury, fundamental and highly
prejudicial error, corrected despite absence of objection
below).
2. Insufficient, Inadequate Instructions:
- Ferrara v. Sheraton McAlpin Corp., 311 F.2d 294, 297-98
(2d Cir. 1962) (failure of judge to explain term of art "con-
structive notice" jeopardized integrity of trial corrected on ap-
peal without objection below).
3. Prejudicial Misleading Instructions:
- Dowell, Inc. v. Jowers, 166 F.2d 214, 221 (5th Cir.) (sug-
gestion of previously awarded damages amounts highly preju-
dicial, calculated to mislead jury, reversed on appeal despite
lack of objection below), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 832 (1948).
4. Failure to Give Instructions:
- Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085,
1089 (4th Cir.) (failure of court to give special rescue instruc-
tion in negligence action misstated fundamental substantive
principles, corrected on appeal despite absence of objection
below), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 136 (1985).
5. Confusing Form of Submission of Instructions:
- United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 576 F.2d 983,
987-88 (3d Cir. 1978) (failure to divide omnibus question into
separate elements left jury without adequate guidance on fun-
damental question, corrected on appeal without objection be-
low), rev'd, 441 U.S. 506 (1979).
6. Failure of Judge to Make Preliminary Determination:
- Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 669 F.2d 1199, 1209
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(8th Cir. 1982) (failure of judge to make initial determination
on apportionment of damages left jury to speculate, where in-
divisible injury involved, plaintiff's failure to object under-
standable, corrected on appeal).
7. But see:
- Parrett v. Connersville, 737 F.2d 690, 698 (7th Cir. 1984)
(doubtful that errors affected outcome of trial, blanket plain-
error exception not recognized in circuit, cost of errors im-
posed on party causing them), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1145
(1985).
- Bertrand v. Southern Pac. Co., 282 F.2d 569, 572 (9th
Cir. 1960) ("plain error" rule not available in civil appeals un-
less instruction objected to below), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 816
(1961).
B. Cause of Action Accrual Date:
- The Barge Shamrock, 635 F.2d 1108, 1111 (4th Cir. 1980)
(date of accrual of cause of action is a question of law, and if incor-
rectly decided constitutes plain error that can be heard on appeal),
cert. denied sub nom. Shell Oil Co. v. United States, 454 U.S. 830
(1981).
C. Pro Se Representation of Class Action:
- Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975)
(per curiam) (permitting pro se litigant to represent inmates in
class action was plain error which can be raised on appeal).
D. Fairness, Integrity, or Public Reputation of Judicial
Proceedings:
- Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 421 n.19 (1977) (court-
ordered voter reapportionment plan, challenged only in part below,
reviewed in toto where errors "seriously affect the fairness, integ-
rity or reputation of judicial proceedings") (quoting United States
v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)).
IV. INTERESTS OF PUBLIC POLICY
A. Need for Judicial Construction of Statute:
- Green v. Brown, 398 F.2d 1006, 1009 (2d Cir. 1968) (con-
struction of Investment Company Act of 1940 involved issues im-
portant to many investors; called for relaxation of general rule).
B. Interest in Enforcement of Act:
- Sheffield Commercial Corp. v. Clemente, 792 F.2d 282, 286
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(2d Cir. 1986) (failure of lease agreement to conform to Motor Ve-
hicle Retail Installment Sales Act noticed first time on appeal be-
cause strong public interest in Act's enforcement).
C. National Policy and Federalism:
- National Metalcrafters, Div. of Keystone Consol. Indus. v.
McNeil, 784 F.2d 817, 825-26 (7th Cir. 1986) (provision of National
Labor Relations Act concerning federal preemption considered
where strongly held policies of state and federal jurisdiction at
issue).
D. Pro Se Litigants:
- Richerson v. Jones, 572 F.2d 89, 96-97 (3d Cir. 1978) (flexible
policy needed in allowing new issues to be raised on appeal when
lay persons initiate complaints of employment discrimination) (su-
perseded by statute as stated in Dougherty v. Lehman, 711 F.2d
555 (3d Cir. 1983)).
V. PURE LEGAL ISSUES
A. Constitutionality of Statute:
- In re Howell, 731 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir.) (constitutionality
of California Sales and Use Tax a question of law; where facts stip-
ulated or fully developed, may be considered first time on appeal),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 933 (1984).
B. Abstention:
- Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1976) (purely legal
issue of federal abstention may be raised for first time on appeal).
C. Application of Statute:
- Higginbothem v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762, 768 n.10 (5th
Cir. 1976) (application of Georgia wrongful death statute raised
purely legal question, not requiring factual development, and
briefed after oral argument, considered first time on appeal).
D. Validity of Regulation:
- Alaska Chapter, Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc. v.
Pierce, 694 F.2d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 1982) (argument that HUD
regulation not authorized by Indian Self-Determination Act a
question of law, considered for first time on appeal).
E. Attorney General Determination:
- Briscoe v. Levi, 535 F.2d 1259, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (where
determination by Attorney General that state maintained discrimi-
natory voting procedures made subsequent to district court dismis-
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sal, pure legal issue could be considered on appeal), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404 (1977).
F. Purely Legal Doctrines:
- Pegues v. Morehouse Parish School Bd., 706 F.2d 735, 738
(5th Cir. 1983) (law of the case and res judicata doctrines purely
legal, considered on appeal without prejudice to defendants).
G. New, Similar Theory:
- Vintero Corp. v. Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento, 675
F.2d 513, 515 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (where argument for im-
position of constructive trust raised below, similar theory of unjust
enrichment considered where additional facts not required).
H. Factors Considered:
- Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 814-15 (9th Cir.) (factors of
pure legal issue, fully developed record, clear resolution of issue,
and injustice to parties, consideration of probable cause issue, but
not complex statute of limitations issue, permitted), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 271 (1986).
- Rodriguez v. Munoz, 808 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1986) (new issue
permitted on appeal to avoid confusion created by erroneous appli-
cation of law by trial judge).
VI. CHOICE OF LAW
A. Duty of Court to Consider Correct Law:
- Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641,
646 (3d Cir. 1958) (right to contract interpretation under correct
state law not waivable; court has duty to consider).
B. Factors Allowing Application of Correct Law:
- Telco Leasing, Inc. v. Transwestern Title Co., 630 F.2d 691,
693-94 (9th Cir. 1980) (award of attorney fees under correct state
law pure legal issue, with clear resolution, not requiring further
facts or complex analysis, considered on appeal).
But see:
- Michael-Regan Co. v. Lindell, 527 F.2d 653, 656-57 (9th Cir.
1975) (conflict of laws issue concerning attorney fees waived when
not raised below).
VII. STATUTE NOT APPLIED, OVERLOOKED
A. Generally:
- Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556-59 (1941) (to comply
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with fundamental justice, taxation of income under alternate stat-
ute considered for first time on appeal because purely a question of
law).
B. Tolling Statute:
- Ricard v. Birch, 529 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1975) (tolling
statute, in mandatory terms, necessary to reach correct result, con-
sidered for first time on appeal).
C. Safety Statute:
- O'Neill v. United States, 411 F.2d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1969)
(safety statute, as expression of state social policy noticed on ap-
peal, remanded for factual development), appeal after remand,
450 F.2d 1012 (3d Cir. 1971).
D. Commission Rules:
- Lilly v. Grand Trunk W. R. Co., 317 U.S. 481, 488-89 (1943)
(rule promulgated by federal safety commission of unquestioned
validity, integral part of Boiler Inspection Act, considered for first
time on appeal).
E. Factors Considered:
- Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 554 (1969) (in-
terests of judicial economy, and undisputed facts, permit consider-
ation of statute not considered below).
- Higginbothem v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762, 768 n.10 (5th
Cir. 1976) (wrongful death statute considered to avoid manifest in-
justice where no new facts required and issue briefed after oral
argument).
- Smith v. Pasqualetto, 246 F.2d 765, 767-68 (1st Cir. 1957)
(lack of omniscience of trial judge and counsel's laxity below war-
rant consideration of statute, where no injustice would be suffered
by appellee or litigants awaiting access to courts).
- Empire Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Valdak Corp., 468 F.2d 330,
334 (5th Cir. 1972) (inapplicability of UCC not advancement of
new theory, but compliance with duty to apply correct law).
F. But see:
1. Statute of Limitations:
- Paetz v. United States, 795 F.2d 1533, 1536 (11th Cir.
1986) (statute of limitations is affirmative defense, waived if
not included in pleadings).
2. Licensing Statute:
- Miller v. Avirom, 384 F.2d 319, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
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(failure to raise issue of licensing statute waived point, in fair-
ness to court and parties, and public interest in finality of
litigation).
3. Statutory Immunity:
- Corsican Prods. v. Pitchess, 338 F.2d 441, 443-44 (9th
Cir. 1964) (prosecuting officer failed to assert Civil Rights Act
immunity below, issue waived on appeal).
VIII. FAILURE TO OBJECT
A. Jury Instructions:
1. Trial Judge Awareness of Issue:
- Brown v. Avemco Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367, 1371 (9th
Cir. 1979) (purpose of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 re-
quiring objection met where court fully aware of plaintiff's po-
sition, and where objection would be pointless formality).
2. Objection Discouraged By Trial Judge:
- American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 447
F.2d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 1971) (trial judge's discouragement of
detailed objection and assurance that record protected war-
ranted consideration of issues on appeal).
3. Alternate Instructions:
- Cone v. Beneficial Standard Life Ins. Co., 388 F.2d 456,
462-63 (8th Cir. 1968) (where trial court expressly recognized
that proffered charge contrary to charge given, issue consid-
ered despite absence of formal objection).
4. Issue of Law:
- Matador Drilling Co. v. Post, 662 F.2d 1190, 1197 (5th
Cir. 1981) (interpretation of contract a matter of law review-
able de novo on appeal, despite failure to object to form of
submission of issues or to propose limiting instructions).
5. But see:
- Dunn v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co., 370 F.2d 681, 684 (10th
Cir. 1966) (heavy burden on parties to make objection with
specificity, acquiesence of district court insufficient to preserve
rights).
B. Admission of Evidence:
1. Facial Indication of Relevancy, Competence
- Harris v. Smith, 372 F.2d 806, 815 (8th Cir. 1967) (when
condition of record and form of question itself indicate ques-
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tion is relevant and competent, no offer of proof needed to
preserve issue).
2. Objection by Other Parties, Notice by Trial Court:
- Howard v. Gonzales, 658 F.2d 352, 356 (5th Cir. 1981)
(objection by co-party sufficient to preserve error on appeal).
- Frateli Gardino, S.P.A. v. Caribbean Lumber Co., 587
F.2d 204, 207 (5th Cir. 1979) (when trial judge expressed un-
certaintly about plaintiff's theory, termed proof of damages as
"ambiguous," issue considered on appeal despite absence of
objection to exhibit containing theory of damages).
3. But see:
- Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324,
1331 (10th Cir. 1984) (objection made by co-defendant cannot
be used to cure his own failure to object).
- Sucher Packing Co. v. Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co.,
245 F.2d 513, 519 (6th Cir. 1957) (although trial judge stated
that exceptions unnecessary during progress of trial, objection
still required at end of trial to preserve issue), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 956 (1958).
C. Improper Comments:
1. By Judge:
- Agee v. Lofton, 287 F.2d 709, 710 (8th Cir. 1961) (clearly
improper and prejudicial remarks of judge noticed on appeal
as plain error, despite counsel's failure to object for fear of an-
tagonizing judge).
2. By Counsel:
- Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 286 (5th
Cir. 1975) (final argument of counsel seriously prejudiced de-
fendant's right to fair trial, noticed on appeal without objec-
tion below).
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